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The current legal regime for use of armed force and the practice of humanitarian intervention 
(HI) have posed enormous challenges to international law and international relations, and HI has 
proven very controversial. This has seen regrettable loss of life and genocidal crimes being 
committed. This gap in the international legal system has no doubt given weight to the emerging 
principle of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which despite the challenges it faces, has made 
significant strides towards norm building. The growing significance of this principle in the fight 
to protect civilians during conflicts has given me the courage to attempt a case for a new, 
consistent and clear legal regime for intervention. After discussing the current legal regime for 
and practice of humanitarian forceful intervention, I offer a theoretical framework cutting 
through a cross section of legal, moral, ethical and political theories that espouse the importance 
of protecting civilians in conflicts and using force when need arises - justly, proportionately and 
as a last resort. I sum up this part with the new framework of R2P as presented in the 2001 report 
of the International Committee for Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), and the 
developments up to the last major UN General Assembly (UNGA) debates in 2009 on R2P. I 
round up my paper with an assessment of the R2P concept in relation to the most recent case of 
the Libyan intervention. However, despite the widespread support and the rapid evolution of R2P 
towards recognition as a legal norm, it still remains non-binding. And its relationship with the 
principle of non-use of force in Article 2(4) remains unclear. Despite the development and the 
application of the R2P principle in recent cases, it has not let to a consistent practice, as its 
application has not yet been up to the aspirations of the standards of the principle. However, in 
view of the current events of international relations, the incessant threat to, and actual loss of 
civilian lives in contemporary conflicts, the increasing understanding of human rights reshaping 
sovereignty and the growing demand for sovereignty as responsibility, one feels obliged to 
advocate for its legal application. 





CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
The legal status of Humanitarian Intervention (HI) has been quite problematic in the past. There 
is no express mentioning of the term HI in the UN Charter. By HI in this study I will be referring 
to the forceful intervention in one state by another state, some major powers or regional 
arrangements based on a flexible interpretation of Article 2(4) of the Charter or the argument for 
HI as a possible fourth exception to the principle of non-use of force. However, the right to 
intervene by use of armed force in situations of threat to international peace and security under  
the UN Security Council (UNSC) mandate in Chapter VII of the Charter, has been applied in 
some cases to intervene for humanitarian purposes. Though, the latter has hardly been used as a 
sufficient legal basis on its own. Nevertheless, strict Charter provisions for the non-use of force 
and non interference within the domestic affairs of a sovereign state by the UN, Articles 2(4) and 
(7) respectively, only emphasize the importance given to state sovereignty over the rights of its 
subjects which may be violated by the state with impunity. There are nevertheless agreed upon 
exceptions to the principle of non use of force to include: By Invitation, UNSC mandate (Articles 
39 and 42) and Self Defense (Article 51). However, the interpretation and application of these 
provisions have nonetheless been problematic. This is especially so as regards Articles 39 and 42 
on UNSC mandate which gives the UNSC the mandate to determine the existence of a threat to 
and breach of international peace and security, and authorize such measures including use of 
force. The application of Article 39 in circumstances where there was hardly any actual threat to 
international peace and security has been contradicting. 
However, if for example, a dictator in a state commits massive violations of the rights of its 
citizens amounting to crimes against humanity or genocide, this may not necessarily be 
interpreted as a threat to international peace and security, or even if it did so, such a dictator may 
have strong ties with one of the veto powers at the UNSC leading to a possible veto of any 
decision to intervene in the said state. Given that such a situation would not amount to self 
defense since there has been no attack on another state, and such a dictator will not himself call 




Even though it is argued that such a situation can be tackled by the insinuation of a doctrine of 
HI from a careful interpretation of the Charter provisions
1
, its legal character is not distinct. This 
has posed enormous challenges especially to traditional legal scholars and positivist legal 
thinkers. Even the progressive development of the concept of HI under customary international 
law has been fraught with practical and methodological challenges. For instance there has been 
limited development of the rules on the use of force for HI by the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ); state practice in this respect has been blurred; and the stances often taken by the UN‟s 
norm creating bodies (the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and the UNSC) have been 
conflicting.
2
 This lack of clear and consistent legal provision for HI has led to untold sufferings 
of civilians due to the failure from the international community to protect them from their states‟ 
brutality. As there would have been better chances to avoid such gross violations had there been 
a clear legal provision for such interventions  
The emergence of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) concept gives a window of opportunity to 
re-visit the HI discourse with a new language. The R2P concept is an emanation from the idea 
that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their citizens from gross or massive 
violations of their rights. The foundation of this principle in international law is based on the 
report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) from 2001 
and its reception by states. This principle, it has been argued, could replace the controversial HI 
principle by re-conceptualizing and adopting a new approach to humanitarian forceful 
intervention.  This is also the reason why I embark on this thesis, to make a case for a new, 
clearer and more distinct legal regime for forceful intervention based on the new R2P concept. 
The R2P concept so far remains an emerging norm of international law and its relationship with 
the principle of non-use of force is thus still problematic. It is still unclear whether it should 
apply as an independent regime for intervention not covered by the prohibition on use of force in 
Article 2(4), as a fourth exception to non-use of force, or as a modification of the UNSC 
mandate. 
                                                          
1
 Spencer Zifcak, The Responsibility to Protect, in International Law by Malcolm D. Evans (2010), page 506. 
2
 Ibid., 507. 
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The underlying assumption in this study is that the current regime for humanitarian forceful 
intervention has failed to provide sufficient answers to tackle the problem of humanitarian 
tragedies that occur within states. And so a new regime is necessary that will meet the changing 
dynamics of international relations, international human rights and international law, one that is 
founded on moral and ethical principles of use of armed force. The R2P concept seems to be 
pointing to the right direction despite the current challenges it faces. 
My overall objective in this study is to analyze the controversial doctrine of HI, and the 
prospects for a new and distinct legal regime through R2P. In so doing I will be examining how 
the concept of state sovereignty and non-intervention is being progressively diluted to 
accommodate other norms of international law such as respect and protection of human rights. I 
will be guided in this process by two overarching questions, namely whether the current regime 
for HI is still tenable, and if not whether the new structure under R2P is the way ahead. From 
these main questions will emerge further sub-questions that I will be answering throughout this 
study namely:  
1. Is HI in conformity with international law as traditionally understood? 
This preliminary discussion in my thesis will attempt to clarify the legal status of the traditional 
HI, and its relationship vis a vis the principles of sovereignty, non-intervention and non-use of 
force. I will equally examine the right to intervene by ROs and their relationship with the UN 
Charter provisions. Here I will focus on the context of the African Union (AU). Then I will 
examine the practice of HI using a selected number of case examples. The purpose of this 
discussion is to illustrate the controversies inherent in the current legal regime and practice of HI. 
This discussion will be covered in Chapter 3 of my thesis. 
2. Does the R2P concept possess sufficient moral, ethical and political foundations to right the 
wrongs of its predecessor HI? 
The R2P concept is founded on the fundamental principles of morality in the resort to armed 
force for the protection of civilians, and is based on the acknowledgment of the principles of 
universality, egalitarianism and human rights for all. This question triggers the discussion on the 
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theories of just war and cosmopolitanism, embodiments of the R2P principle. This will be 
covered in Chapter 4 and part of Chapter 5 of my thesis. 
3. What is the normative status of the R2P principle? 
R2P is an emerging principle of international law. The analysis under this question will track the 
evolution of R2P from its shared normative understanding towards an international legal norm. 
Has it acquired yet the status of a legal norm under international law or is it merely accepted as a 
shared social norm? What is lacking for it to turn into hard law? This will be the bone of 
contention in Chapter 5 of this study. 
4. Has there emerged an effective practice of R2P? 
This question seeks to find out whether the R2P principle has been tested in practical terms, 
whether such practice has reflected the legitimacy and legality requirements, and whether there 
has been congruence with established rules and shared norms. The Libyan intervention which 
may be seen as R2P in action as presented in Chapter 6, will serve the purpose of this 
assessment. 
This thesis does not seek to provide an exhaustive study of the doctrine of HI and the new R2P 
principle. Rather it attempts to answer certain questions as to the legal status of the HI principle 
and the future prospects for protection of people from gross human rights violations. The case 
examples of HI in this study are not exhaustive but, one may argue that they illustrate the 
prevailing controversies surrounding the principle. Equally, I am not going to adopt the 
integrated R2P approach as presented by the ICISS report, rather, I will be focusing on one of the 
arms of R2P namely that of responsibility to react or responsibility to protect. However for a 
better understanding of my study this integrated R2P approach will be given a short explanation 
in chapter five below before laying more emphasis on my area of concern.   
The study is subdivided into seven chapters. After this introduction, chapter II will focus on the 
methodology applied to address the questions posed. In chapter III, I will tackle the normative 
principles of sovereignty/non-intervention and non-use of force vis a vis the controversial HI 
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doctrine. I will equally examine some case examples of alleged HI to further highlight the 
controversies surrounding the principle. In chapter IV, I will provide moral, ethical and political 
arguments for HI as it ought to be, based on the Just War Theory (JWT) and the cosmopolitan 
perspective. Chapter V will be based on the R2P principle; its evolution, its new approach to 
intervention, the justifications for the principle and challenges it faces. In chapter VI, I will be 
looking at R2P in action with the Libyan intervention as case study. Chapter VII will cover my 

























CHAPTER II: METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES  
2.1 Choice of Method and Challenges 
The nature of my research questions require me to carry out my analysis within the framework of 
public international law. However, I will not limit myself strictly to this framework as I will 
partly apply the pattern of theoretical analysis in political and other social sciences to broaden 
the scope of my research and provide ideal answers to the questions posed. Moreover, as 
Oppenheim in 1908 rightfully observed, there is no one right method in international law.
3
 
However, this does not mean that a choice of method needs not be made. Oppenheim states in 
this respect that the right method is the one that secures the best results in the light of the topic of 
investigation and research.
4
 In this chapter, I will be discussing the traditional positivist method 
and its challenges, the latter being the reason why I will adopt the more progressive form of legal 
positivism adopted by contemporary legal scholars. I will equally mention in brief the relevance 
of adopting an interdisciplinary approach to legal, philosophical and political science theories 
and methods of analysis for my thesis. 
2.1.1 Enlightened Positive Methodology 
The central foundation of the positive method of international law is state consent.
5
 This theory 
of law, wherein states are regarded as ends in themselves, could be said to be „an evil, but a 
necessary evil‟, as Carty observes that the lawyer or legal scholar has no basis upon which to 
develop an alternative method.
6
 Classic positivists consider that there is only hard law and no 
soft law. However, this approach to international law based on the possibility of objectivity in 
law has been criticized as being old fashioned and conservative. It fails to take into consideration 
the changing realities of our time - from international conflicts to internal violence sometimes 
pitting the state against its own citizens.
7
 This coupled with the inability to incorporate all modes 
of state consent to be bound at all times has raised questions about the strict positivist 
                                                          
3
 Oppenheim L. The Science of International Law: Its Tasks and Methods (1908) 2 AJIL 313, 314. 
4
 Ibid., 327. 
5
 Roberto Ago, Positive Law and International Law (1957) AJIL 691, 698-700. 
6
 Anthony Carty, the Decay of International Law? (1989), Manchester University Press 108. 
7
 Bruno Simma and Andreas L Paulus, The Responsibility of Individuals for Human Rights Abuses in Internal 
Conflicts: A Positivist View (1999) 93 AJIL p. 302. 
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methodology of international law. Such criticisms have led modern scholars of legal positivism 
to reflect on new ways to adapt legal positivism to new developments in international affairs – 
leading to the development of the modern or enlightened positivist method.
8
 This is the 
methodology that I will adopt in my study. The enlightened positivists consider law not 
independent from its context, be it socio-political or historical.
9
 They equally give value to soft 
law instruments such as joint statements, declarations, General Assembly Resolutions, etc, as 
important interpretative tool,
10
 and above all affirm the central position of formal sources of law.  
This choice of methodology which reaffirms long established norms of international law and at 
the same time recognizes the progressive development of the law to meet with modern realities, 
will imply a lex lata and lex ferenda
11
 approach to legal analysis. The choice of this method of 
legal analysis will necessitate that I indicate at what point I am applying lex lata and lex ferendi 
respectively. The discussions in chapter three of this study which touches on traditional rules of 
international law namely, sovereignty, non-intervention and non-use of force, vis a vis the 
exceptions to the principle of non-use of force under the Charter, will imply a lex lata approach 
to legal analysis. Chapter IV and V which discusses on the future of HI inspired by the moral and 
ethical theories of just war and the ideal cosmopolitan world order and drawing on the R2P 
concept, will imply a lex ferendi approach to legal analysis. Chapter VI on the Libyan 
intervention wherein there is a blurring of the current law on use of force based on a UNSC 
mandate with the new R2P doctrine and testing to what extent the Libyan action stretched the lex 
lata would imply an interaction of lex lata and lex ferendi approaches in this chapter. 
As mentioned above, the enlightened positivist method acknowledges the central position of the 
formal sources of law. And as well as it take cognizance of the presence of interpretative tools 
such as judicial pronouncements and teachings of qualified publicists, they equally give value to 
soft law instruments as other important interpretative tools. This necessitates that I at this point 
examine the sources of law which I will be applying in my dissertation. 
                                                          
8
 Simma and Paulus (1999) p. 305, 306. 
9
 Ibid., 306. 
10
 Ibid., 306, 307. 
11
 The lex lata refers to the law as it is/law which has been made, positive law, while the lex ferenda refers to the law 
as it ought to be or law which ought to be made, future law 
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2.1.2 Sources of Law 
Sources of international law are the materials and processes out of which the rules and principles 
regulating the international community are developed.
12
 States typically give their consent to be 
bound by international agreements by ratifying them, and the respect for international 




The formal sources of law adopted under positivist international law are the sources listed under 
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) which reflects customary 
international law.
14
 Article 38(1) (a) – (c) mentions treaties (agreements binding upon the parties 
to it and which must be performed in good faith in accordance with the principle of pacta sunct 
servanda); customary international law (which presupposes an established practice by states and 
a psychological element known as opinion juris); and general principles of law, as the formal 
sources of law, while 38(1) (d) mentions judicial pronouncements and teachings of publicists as 
means of ascertaining the rules of international law contained in the above mentioned formal 
sources.
15
 Treaties, customary international law and general principles of law will be very vital 
sources of law for my study. The UN Charter will be the main source of treaty law for this study, 
but other treaties such as the AU Constitutive Act will also be mentioned, and I will also apply 
teachings of publicists and judicial pronouncements of the ICJ to show the existence of relevant 
rules of international law. 
However, these sources of international law can be said to be non-exhaustive. This essentially 
formalist system of sources of law could limit the creativity of legal scholars.
16
 Though it could 
be argued that creativity is bad for predictability, predictability could limit the participatory 
engagement necessary for a progressive system of international law. The challenges would be to 
the ambitious researcher in international law who wishes to take into consideration the political, 
social and historical realities of society and attain ideal solutions based on diverse perspectives 
                                                          
12
 Hugh Thirlway, The Sources of International Law, in International Law by Malcolm D. Evans (2010),  page 96 
13
 Thirlway (2010) p. 97. Also mentioned in 1969 Vienna Convention Article 26 
14
Girmachew Alemu Aneme, The Study of the African Union‟s Right of Intervention against Genocide, Crimes 




 Carty (1989) p. 108, 109. 
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and empirical developments. However, as mentioned earlier, contemporary positivists adopt a 
more flexible approach that gives value to soft law as an important interpretative tool and takes 
into consideration the socio-political and historical context of law making. 
The term „soft law‟ was coined to describe instruments with non-legally binding effect which are 
not considered formal sources of international law. They comprise of principles, standards, 
commitments and general norms governing international relations.
17
 Such soft law instruments 
may include: declarations of intergovernmental conferences; resolutions of the UNGA and other 
multilateral bodies; codes of conduct, guidelines and recommendations of international 
organizations, to name a few.
18
 Even though soft law is not mentioned as one of the formal 
sources of international law it may have a legal effect based on „good faith‟. Equally, its 
relevance as a constitutive element of international law making and development is now widely 
appreciated; the Universal Declaration of Human Rights for example has provided the basis for 
development of several human rights treaties.
19
 Soft law may be regarded as evidence of existing 
law or formative of the „opinio juris‟ for law to come.
20
 Its non-legally binding and less 
compelling nature could still considerably influence state practice generating customary law, as 
states may not be ready to accept binding resolutions at a particular time but may gradually take 
measures to conform to the sought international standards. Thus soft law can often serve as a 
compromise between sovereignty and the need to establish rules to govern international 
relations.
21
 Soft law will provide a wide variety of analytical tools in my study. The R2P report 
that culminated with the Report of the 2004 World Summit, which is the basis upon which I rely 
in advocating for a new legal regime for intervention, is a soft law instrument. Its non-
compelling nature has no doubt contributed to its near global recognition, making it easier for 
states to digest and understand its content and standards and may gradually lead to its legal 
recognition. 
 
                                                          
17
 Daniel Thurer, Soft Law, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law www.mpepil.com p.6. 
18
 A.E. Boyle, Some reflections on the relationship between treaties and soft law, ICLQ 1999 P. 2. 
19
 Thurer, p. 2. 
20
Thirlway (2010),  p. 122  
21
Thurer, p. 2. 
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2.1.3 Rules of Interpretation of Treaties  
In international law, disputes as to the meaning of some specific treaty provisions often arise. 
Equally, the growing number of treaties developed to settle strategic issues both at international 
and regional levels often give rise to questions such as to what extent and under what conditions 
should a given provision apply. However, this problem was somewhat reduced by the coming 
into force of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). This convention 
meant to give more weight to a literal, systematic and teleological interpretation of treaties (the 
textual and teleological approach) regarded as an „objective interpretation‟. This was contrary to 
the initially favoured subjective approach based on the negotiating history (the preparatory 
works) of the treaty which considers the intention of the parties as a subjective element distinct 
from the treaty text.
22
 Article 31 (1) which I shall be very useful for my work is to the effect that: 
„A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given 
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose‟.
23
 
I will largely adopt the textual and teleological approaches in my work as contained in Article 31 
(1) of the VCLT and which reflects customary law as per the 2007 ICJ Judgment in the case 
between Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro concerning the application of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. In this case, the ICJ 
reiterated the rules of interpretation, as it held as stated in the provisions of Articles 31 and 32.
24
 
Article 31 is a vital provision which I will apply in my study whereas the UN Charter is the 
central treaty for the purpose of this study which will then be subjected to the rules of 
interpretation. Article 31(1) spells out the textual teleological approaches to treaty interpretation 
and states that treaties are to be interpreted in good faith according to the ordinary meaning given 
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. Article 31(2) 
goes further to observe that the context for this purpose shall comprise in addition to the text, 
including its preamble and annexes. Art 31(3) goes further to mention other issues to be taken 
into account together with the context, e.g. any subsequent practice in the application of the 
                                                          
22
 Antonio Cassese, International Law (2005) Oxford University Press, p. 178. 
23
 VCLT (1969), Article 31 (1). 
24




treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation, and any rules of 
international law applicable in the relations between the parties. In this respect the 1970 
Declaration on Friendly Relations, an instrument that demonstrates the norm clarification 
capabilities of the UNGA, is evidence of such subsequent practice relating to the interpretation 
of UN Charter provisions. 
The textual approach to treaty interpretation, which considers the treaty text as the authentic 
expression of the intentions of the parties shall be resorted to in this study for the explanation of 
the text of treaties used for this study. However where the treaty text for this study is vague, as in 
the case of Article 2(4) and it‟s open-ended nature that has attracted varying interpretations, I 
will resort to the teleological approach which allows for the interpretation of a treaty in line with 
the objectives and purposes of the treaty in the context spelled out Article 31(2). 
Article 32 of VCLT gives room for recourse to the preparatory works of the treaty and the 
circumstances of its conclusion, but only as a supplementary means of treaty interpretation in 
order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of Article 31 or clear some 
ambiguities and absurd results from its application. It will not be vital for this study. 
2.2 An interdisciplinary approach 
The nature of my topic and the objectives I intend to attain warrant me to look beyond the formal 
sources of international law for the necessary material for my analysis. Moreover, the lex ferenda 
approach that I adopt in parts of my analysis will call for a projection in different directions that 
might not be limited to soft law and the elaborate teachings of legal scholars. The broad and open 
ended nature of the lex ferenda approach of legal analysis would allow me to go on a wide chase 
for inspiration from different sources namely; legal philosophy, political science and other moral 
and ethical theories on the topic. The part of this study based on testing the practice of R2P in the 
recent Libya case will permit me to follow up the day to day progression of events based on 





As seen above, the traditional positivist international law methodology is somewhat limiting. Its 
strong reliance on hard law and the state as the main subject of international law making gives 
the individuals who are subjects of the state limited chances in defending their rights against 
infringements from the supposed guarantor. There is a need for other legal theories or methods to 
take into consideration the developing concerns about state anarchy and violations of rights of 
subjects. Equally, the strictly formalist system of sources of law limits creativity and misses 
empirical trends. However, the enlightened positivist methodology, which I adopt in my thesis, is 
more accommodative and progressive. As mentioned above, enlightened positivists consider law 
not to be independent from its historical, political, and sociological contexts, and they consider 
soft law as a relevant interpretative tool. This flexible approach to legal analysis would be worth 
venturing, taking into consideration the context of my study. Also, a combination of the legal 
method and political science theories, though challenging will be relevant in describing the 















CHAPTER III: THE CURRENT LEGAL REGIME 
The current legal regime governing HI has been widely criticized for its weaknesses.  HI is not 
expressly mentioned in the Charter; it has remained one of the most controversial areas of 
international law as its status remains uncertain and the practice of states has raised protracted 
debates.
25
 The practice of HI has evolved around the variety of legal basis: interpreting Article 
2(4) of the Charter so that it does not cover HI, as a fourth exception to the principle of non use 
of force as provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter, and the occasional controversial 
application of UNSC mandate under Chapter VII. The UNSC holds wide powers under Chapter 
VII and its often flexible manner in interpreting this area of the law has led to the use of the latter 
for purposes of HI.
26
 This lack of a distinct and clear provision for intervention has been partly 
blamed for the inconsistencies and apathy in the exercise of the right to intervene by the 
international community. Such inconsistencies have been expressed in the legal questions that 
usually arise when the question for intervention is tabled. Questions such as when is it right to 
intervene? Who has the ultimate authority to order intervention? Who is obliged to intervene? 
How such an intervention should be carried out? These are some of the questions that have 
generated contradictions in the domain of HI. The absence of clear answers to these questions 
has amongst other things led to the inactions and sometimes belated actions from the 
international community with the resulting consequences of many losses in civilian lives. And 
unless clear cut answers are provided for these questions, HI will remain questionable.  
This chapter will be subdivided in two main parts. In the first part, I will be looking at the 
principle of state sovereignty and the dilemma it has created between respecting the core 
principles of non-intervention and non-use of force, and the need to violate these principles for 
humanitarian purposes. In the second part I will be examining the legal right to intervene as it is 
often inferred from Chapter VII of the Charter, i.e. UNSC mandate to intervene in event of 
threats to or breach of international peace and security, and from other interpretations of the 
Charter. I will illustrate the controversial and inconsistent application of HI with some case 
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examples, before I examine the role of Regional Organizations like the African Union and their 
relationship with the international regime for intervention.  
3.1 State Sovereignty and Non-intervention 
3.1.1 The Dilemma of the State Sovereignty Principle 
The consensus for the existence of an international society of sovereign states has remained 
predominant in international relations. In this regard, states have been predominantly concerned 
with defending their interests while equally upholding the institutions of international society.
27
  
However, the greatest challenge that this notion of international society and state sovereignty has 
faced in recent times has come from the contemporary ideals of major powers, international and 
regional organizations, to intervene in the domestic affairs of sovereign states for humanitarian 
purposes.
28
 The acclaimed notion of state sovereignty, as laid down in the Treaty of Westphalia 
(1648), codified basic principles of territorial integrity, border inviolability and state supremacy.  
This notion of state sovereignty has been the premise on which the rules governing international 
society and international relations have been established and the respect of the principle has been 
the foundation of international order.
29
 Sovereignty in terms of authority has been defined as „the 
right to rule over a delimited territory and the population residing within it‟.
30
 This definition of 
sovereignty is not limited to the internal attributes of states, but equally represents the significant 
standard of behavior among members of the international society and the recognition by the 
community of states. This form of recognition is important in an international system in which 
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Amongst the main goals and purposes of the UN, the maintenance of global peace and security, 
and the need to develop friendly relations amongst states are crucial.
32
 In furtherance of these 
purposes, the international community after 1945 under the auspices of the UN, developed the 
cardinal principles now enshrined in Article 2 of the Charter to wit: the sovereign equality of its 
member States, the prohibition on the threat or use of force and the exclusion of any rights of the 
UN to interfere in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a State.
33
 Article 2(7) 
notes however that the latter principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement 
measures under chapter VII of the Charter.
34
 The principles of sovereignty and non intervention 
have been and remain central in the attempt by the international community to maintain peaceful 
coexistence among states and banish war and violence from international relations.
35
These 




Despite the normative character of the principles of sovereignty and non-use of force, it is widely 
acknowledged that a strict adherence to these principles might lead to inaction in the face of 
massive violations of human rights.
37
 This could be what the drafters of the Charter had in mind 
when introducing the exemption clause in Article 2(7). As a result, possible intervention and the 
need to respect the sovereignty principle have often come into conflict.  
3.1.2 Prohibition on the use of force 
Conventional international law prohibits the use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political dependence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purpose of the 
United Nations, according to Article 2(4) of the Charter. It has gained the status of customary 
international law, as the International Court of Justice (ICJ), in a case brought by Nicaragua 
against the USA for unlawful intervention and use of force, held that the principle of non-use of 
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force was customary international law and that the USA was in breach thereof.
38
 The massive 
abuse of human rights within a state by the state itself or as a result of ethnic rivalries or other 
intrastate conflicts, and the states‟ incapacity or otherwise inability to protect its citizens from 
such violations, has put to question this part of the non-intervention principle which is the 
cornerstone of state sovereignty. The post Rwanda and Yugoslavia era has seen a move towards 
an international consensus to prevent future Rwandas and Bosnia Herzegovinas. The last two 
decades have seen a rise of interventionism to protect foreign citizens who are victims of a 
state‟s violations of their fundamental human rights. As Ayoob observes, there are instances 
where state institutions collapse and cannot guarantee the protection of the people. In this 
circumstance, the social contract binding the state and citizens breaks down, and it can be argued 
that state sovereignty can be said to have ceased to exist.
39
 Statements of international figures 
such as UN Secretary Generals
40
, actions of the UN Security Council under Chapter VII 
involvement, and multinational coalitions such as NATO, have during the past few decades 
expressed a rebuttal of the notion of unlimited sovereignty as sacrosanct.
41
 
However, there are acceptable exceptions to the principles of sovereignty and non-use of force to 
wit, by invitation of the concerned state, the Charter provisions self defense, and UNSC 
authorization.
42
 But just like the doctrine of preemptive self defense, the doctrine of HI has been 
criticized for allowing states to use force in circumstances that differ significantly from the above 
accepted grounds.
43
 This among other factors has resulted in the often lukewarm attitude towards 
such interventions and the UNSC‟s reputation as the watchdog of global peace and security has 
been questionable. The UN‟s use of its chapter VII powers in places like Iraq (1991), Somalia 
(1992) and former Yugoslavia (1992)
44
, though controversial, has nonetheless demonstrated the 
increasing strategic role of human rights in international relations. I will now examine the right 
to intervene. 
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3.2 The Legal Right to Intervene with Armed Force 
There are exceptions to the principle of non-intervention and the non-use of force and two of 
these are contained in Chapter VII of the Charter. The right to self defense in Article 51 is the 
main exception that gives right to collective or individual response to an armed attack by another 
state. Another exception is by invitation by the concerned state.
45
 Lastly, the collective security 
mandate of the UNSC to respond to threats to international peace and security spells out in 
Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter certain measures including the use of armed force. This branch 
of international law has been subject to widespread controversies and contradictions as to what 
constitutes self defense on the one hand and the complex UNSC mandate on the other.
46
 There 
have moreover been arguments in favour of HI based on some states‟ interpretation Article 2(4) 
of the Charter, an argument that has developed since the interventions in Iraq and Kosovo. 
Another position voiced has been HI as a possible fourth exception to the provision on non-use 
of force. This argument favours HI as an autonomous institution distinct from the UNSC 
mandate to authorize use of force against a threat to or breach of international peace and 
security.
47
 In spelling out the duty of maintaining global peace and security, the Charter in 
Article 52 equally provides for the UNSC‟s role to be supplemented by Regional Organizations 
(ROs) where necessary. Therefore, it is relevant also to examine the role of ROs. 
3.2.1. Humanitarian Intervention under the UN Charter 
Considering the rapid development of human rights as universal principles and the need to 
protect people from gross violations, states and the international community as a whole are 
gradually embracing the concept of collective security through the UN Charter provisions under 
a centralized UNSC supervision. The practice of the UNSC is said to have established a direct 
link between humanitarian crisis and threat to the peace under Article 39 of the Charter that 
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triggers UNSC action under that chapter.
48
 The relevant provisions of the Charter to such UNSC 
mandate include Articles 39, 41 and 42 cited below: 
Article 39: “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what 
actions shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international 
peace and security” 
Article 41: “The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed 
force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the members of the 
United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of 
economic relations and rail, sea, air, postal telegraphic, radio and other means of 
communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations”  
Article 42: “Should the Security Council consider that the measures provided for in Article 41 
would be inadequate or has proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea or land 
forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such actions 
may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea or land forces of 
members of the United Nations” 
It is from the above provisions that the doctrine of HI has often been inferred from the Charter by 
interpreting certain apparent humanitarian crisis situations as threat to international peace and 
security even in situations where there is no such threat in the literary sense. Presumably a 
demonstrable need to extend the threshold of Article 39. As mentioned above, this branch of 
international law and the doctrine of HI in particular have been subject to a lot of controversy. 
Such controversies have been blamed partly on the lack of a detailed framework and other 
structural deficiencies. The post cold war era saw the rise of numerous crises leading to military 
interventions particularly in states without the consent of their government. Such interventions 
have either been authorised by the UNSC or a regional organization or they have been unilateral 
interventions by powerful states with a variety of legal justifications. However, it has been 
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observed that such actions have not been restricted and carried out in ways as envisaged in the 
Charter.
49
 Even the actions carried out with a UNSC mandate under chapter VII have not been 
clear as to establish a right to do more than the text of the UN Charter Chapter VII opens up for. 
There has often been a controversial link between a humanitarian crisis and a threat to 
international peace and security despite the absence in some cases of any objective threat. Also, 
several of these actions have bypassed the central authority of the UNSC and have been justified 
on varying grounds. Ironically enough, the earlier practice of intervention often relied upon by 
supporters of HI, was not termed HI as such by the intervening states, as they preferred to rely on 
the better established right of self-defence. Such cases would be easily related to HI today, but 
several states at that time didn‟t think human rights violation should justify use of force.
50
 And 
since they did not claim HI, it is difficult to refer to them as relevant state practice. Such were the 
1971 intervention of India to end repression and support self determination in Bangladesh, the 
1978 intervention by Vietnam to end the murderous rule of Pol Pot in Cambodia, and the 1979 




The UK on its part, in defending its actions in Iraq (1991), developed the doctrine of HI as a 
separate institution, arguing that Article 2(4) of the Charter has developed over time to meet new 
situations and that HI without invitation of the country concerned can be justified in cases of 
extreme humanitarian need.
52
 If such an intervention is justifiable in situations of extreme 
humanitarian need, and does not violate the territorial integrity or political independence of the 
said state, and is consistent with the purposes of the UN, then it can be justified. But the question 
that comes to mind here is this: considering such an assertion by the UK, namely that HI was 
justified in cases of extreme humanitarian need, should an intervention be based on a unilateral 
decision by one or a coalition of states, or on a multilateral basis based on the UN mandate?  
Also, is there sufficient state practice to back the UK position? It can be said that such arguments 
on the implied existence of HI have equally inspired the consideration of HI as a possible fourth 
exception to the principle of non-use of force in the Charter. Nevertheless, it is difficult to infer 
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HI by any stretch of textual interpretation of the Charter provisions as provided by the VCLT. 
Equally, the teleological approach based on interpretation of treaties in light of declared or 
apparent objectives still poses a dilemma. This is in the sense that the purposes and objectives of 
the UN Charter as expressed both by the preamble and in subsequent agreements relating to the 
application of the treaty, together with subsequent practice in the application of the treaty, have 
been more in favour of developing friendly relations amongst states and the non-use of force 
save in situations provided for by the Charter. And though other purposes and principles of the 
Charter include the respect and protection of human rights and dignity, HI has remained 
controversial as the focus seems to have been more on the maintenance of international peace 
and security. Nevertheless, the quest for an autonomous regime for HI has remained constant 
since the Iraq and Kosovo intervention and has culminated with the emergence of the R2P 
concept. This trend in the development and understanding of HI is worth examining in more 
detail in the following cases:  
3.2.1.1 Implied authority to act in Iraq 1991  
The question of HI was debated upon during the 1991 invasion of Iraq. In response to Iraq‟s 
invasion of Kuwait, the UNSC in Resolution 678 by a unanimous vote authorized a US led 
military force to defend Kuwait against the Iraqi invasion.
53
 The Council later imposed a 
ceasefire in Resolution 687 after Iraq had been driven from Kuwait, but failed to make 
provisions for the protection of human rights in Iraq.
54
 When the Iraqi government turned to 
repress the Kurds and other ethnic groups, the Council passed another Resolution (688) in April 
1991, asking Iraq to end its repression and allow access to humanitarian agencies. Though the 
Resolution did not provide for use of force, the USA, the UK and France instituted no fly zones 
and intervened to protect civilians.
55
 This later intervention by the coalition powers in Iraq in 
1991 was not sanctioned by an immediate UN authorization. They argued that their actions were 
purely justified on humanitarian grounds and that Resolution 688 had provided implicit legal 
authorization intervention.
56
 However, such claim of implicit authorization of HI was difficult to 
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justify, as the terms of the resolution did not allow for such expansive interpretation.
57
 This has 
led to controversial debate on the right of a state or states to unilaterally engage in intervention 
on humanitarian grounds without authorization from the UNSC. These arguments in favour of 
such an approach to HI laid a very fragile foundation for the concept.
58
  
3.2.1.2 Delayed action and failure to act in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda 
In other places such as Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda, the UNSC was either reluctant to act, had 
a poor strategy, or failed to act at all. The failures by the Council in such places have been 
attributed to structural deficiencies of the Council, and sometimes to self interest and bad faith of 
the Council members.
59
 In Somalia, the UNSC justified its intervention on the fact that the 
obstacles to delivering humanitarian assistance to the suffering population could constitute a 
threat to international peace and security.
60
 In UNSC Resolution 794 from 1992, a landmark 
resolution, the UNSC declared that the internal humanitarian crisis constituted a threat to 
international peace and security, and authorized use of force.
61
 The overwhelming resolve of the 
international commitment to this crisis was to ensure a safe delivery of humanitarian assistance; 
this was especially the position of the US.
62
 However when the situation completely degenerated 
into chaos, the mission could not avert the subsequent tragic out come. The killing of US soldiers 




The UN also faced difficulties in Bosnia amongst which was the challenge of deciding the 
purpose and style of intervention, whether it was enforcement under chapter VII of the Charter or 
peace keeping and the fear of the permanent members of the Council to be drawn into another 
complex conflict, which made them less inclined to support firm UN action in the crisis, and 
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instead demanded that the Europeans should take the lead.
64
 The lack of cooperation between the 
UN and the parties, the ambitious but unrealistic mandate given to the UN Protection Force 
(UNPROFOR), and its subsequent authority to use force, led to conflict between UNPROFOR 
and the Bosnian Serbs.
65
 The UNSC used its authority under Chapter VII in a series of 
resolutions; including Resolution 770 from 1992. Once again the UNSC recognized that 
humanitarian crisis constituted a threat to international peace and security and called upon states 




When another crisis broke out in Rwanda, the experience of Somalia influenced the UNSC to 
retreat from chapter VII to VI of the Charter, and the limited peace keeping force present at the 
time was barely capable of defending itself.
67
 Like the previous case, the UNSC held that that the 
crisis constituted a threat to international peace and security and though late, authorized the 
French military to intervene to prevent further mass atrocities.
68
 However, at the start of the 
crisis in Rwanda, the small force had no robust mandate and could not intervene to prevent the 
mass slaughter of 500,000 people in three months by the Hutu government and militia.
69
 As 
Mayall puts it, this crisis was the UN‟s worst hour in Africa.
70
 
3.2.1.3 New doctrine of humanitarian intervention in Kosovo 
The 1999 NATO action in Kosovo equally led to a prolonged debate. The debate centered on a 
possible reinterpretation of Article 2(4), an implied authorization of the UNSC, and the implied 
existence of an autonomous regime for HI in cases of extreme humanitarian need.
71
 In the case 
brought before the ICJ by Yugoslavia against NATO member states concerning the Legality of 
Use of Force, the various state actors gave a variety of explanations and legal justifications for 
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 The UK argued for an autonomous regime for HI.
73
 Belgium equally raised the 
argument of evolvement of Article 2(4) and that the use of force was allowed since it was not 
directed against the territorial integrity or political independence of Yugoslavia, but was 
necessary to protect those human rights which had achieved the status of jus cogens.
74
 Other 
parties such as the Netherlands argued that the intervention by NATO followed directly from the 
Security Council Resolution 1203 and as such could not be described as unilateral.
75
 Other 
countries joined Yugoslavia in vehemently opposing the action by NATO, and condemning HI in 
general, stating that Article 2(4) should be construed strictly as prohibiting the use of force and 
that only the UNSC acting under Chapter VII could authorize the use of force.
76
 This event can 
be said to have further complicated the controversies surrounding the doctrine of HI. The fact 
that the UNSC failed to condemn NATO‟s actions, though hardly surprising, raised further 
controversies about HI. 
3.2.1.4 Failure to protect in Darfur 
The violent conflict in Darfur (Western Sudan) began in 2003 and resulted in serious violations 
of human rights and international humanitarian law according to the reports of the International 
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur and a later finding of the International Criminal Court (ICC).
77
 
This commission was appointed by the UNSG acting under UNSC Resolution 1564 of 18 
September 2004 requesting the UNSG to establish an international commission of inquiry to 
investigate the alleged violations in Darfur by the parties to the conflict.
78
According to the UN 
report, over 300,000 people lost their lives, about 2 million became displaced persons, and over 
250,000 refugees.
79
  Once again the world stood aside and watched a near repetition of Rwanda 
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and Bosnia as the government sponsored militias launched an ethnic cleansing on civilians in the 
western region of Darfur.
80
 Despite the findings and condemnation of the human rights abuses in 
Darfur by governments, the civil society and intergovernmental organizations, the UN and the 
AU remained passive. A majority of the UN member states expressed reluctance in pressing for 
action in Darfur. The debate over imposing sanctions on the Sudanese government or taking 
military action remained deeply divided, and also, there was dispute over who should bear 
responsibility to protect the people of Darfur - the UN, AU or Sudan.
81
 The UN, AU and member 
states were not willing to take action in the absence of consent by the Sudanese government.
82
 
The international community left the political and military action to a feeble AU that could not 
effectively respond to the mass killings and destruction.
83
 The AU‟s unwillingness to conduct 
proper inquiries into the Darfur crisis, their unwillingness to cooperate with the UN and human 
rights organizations to that effect, and the failure to identify the mass killing of civilians as 
crimes against humanity, demonstrated their lack of political will to take action according to the 
Constitutive Act.
84
 Even the implementation of a UNSC proposal for a UN force or a hybrid 
AU/UN force with power to take action to protect civilians was delayed by the lack of 
cooperation from the Sudanese government.
85
 The crisis in Darfur raised a lot of complex issues 
in relation to the law on HI. The UN‟s unwillingness to take action coupled with the 
contradictory stance of the AU led to the adoption of less robust measures and the continuous 
sufferings of the people of Darfur. This crisis further revealed the gaps in the present legal 
structure on HI and the failure to match the „responsibility to protect‟ rhetoric with action.
86
 At 
this point, I will discuss the right to intervene by ROs and their relationship with the „mother 
regime‟ of the UNSC. 
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3.2.2. The Right to Intervention by Regional Organizations 
Article 52 of the Charter provides for UN action under chapter VII to be supplemented by 
regional action.
87
 The Charter gives ROs the right to intervene in such matters relating to the 
maintenance of peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, and such regional 
agencies and their actions must be consistent with the purpose and principles of the UN.
88
 
However, according to the wordings of Article 52(2), such action shall be limited to pacific 
settlements. And although Article 53(1) holds that the UNSC shall utilize such ROs for 
enforcement actions, it also states that no enforcement action shall be taken by the ROs without 
UNSC authorization.  The role of ROs in assisting the UN in its role of maintaining international 
peace and security is crucial. This is seen in the increasing and significant cooperation between 
the UN and ROs in responding to humanitarian crisis situations in places such as the Ivory Coast, 
Sierra Leone, Liberia, and in Yugoslavia, where for the first time the UNSC authorized regional 
agencies to use force to implement economic embargoes and facilitate delivery of humanitarian 
aid.
89
 However, there has been controversy over the use of armed force by ROs without the 
authorization of the UNSC, and whether failure by the UNSC to condemn such actions as was 
the case of NATO in Kosovo, amounted to acceptance, certainly contradicts the aims of UN as 
enshrined in the Charter.  
Another important but problematic area of the right to intervene by ROs is the provision under 
the African Union (AU) Constitutive Act Article 4(h).
90
 This provision gives the African Union 
the right to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the AU Assembly in respect of 
grave circumstances, such as war crimes, genocides, and crimes against humanity. Non 
intervention, being a peremptory norm of international law, is nevertheless also reflected in the 
AU Constitutive Act
91
. Though not similar to the provision of Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, 
Art. 4(g) of the Constitutive Act provides for non interference by any member State into the 
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internal affairs of another. Also, other principles of the AU express the non-intervention norm.
92
 
However, the numerous abuses of human rights by African states against their citizens, the 
failure by the then Organisation for African Unity (OAU) to stop massive human rights 
violations from dictators like Idi Amin in Uganda, Bokossa in the Central African Republic, and 
the lessons from Rwanda, led to the decision to incorporate the right of intervention in the 
Constitutive Act of the AU.
93
 
The debate has been centered on the need for prior UN Security Council authorization for the 
implementation of the decision to intervene under Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act, and the 
need to respect the jus cogens rule in Article 2(4) of the Charter.    The AU being a regional 
organization under the provision of Article 53 of the UN Charter requires a prior UNSC 
authorization for intervention. Equally, several provisions of the Constitutive Act and the AU 
Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) Protocol stress the need for guidance and cooperation with 
the UNSC. Nevertheless, neither the Constitutive Act nor the AUPSC Protocol provides 
explicitly for prior UNSC authorization for intervention under Article 4(h).
94
 Even the views 
expressed in the „Ezulwini Consensus‟
95
 are not clear as on the one hand it affirms the need for 
UNSC authorization for intervention of ROs, and on the other hand affirms the legality of use of 
force under Article 4(h) of the Act without referring to the UN Security Council authorization. 
According to the statement of the Ezulwini Consensus, Member States declared their willingness 
to act and get approval „after the fact‟.
96
 Another possible way for the AU to avoid need for prior 
UNSC authorization for forcible intervention into a member state in grave situations is the idea 
of consent by treaty which is a possible future approach for African states. Under such an 
approach, member states would be deemed to have consented or called for intervention by 
invitation in grave situations upon ratifying certain regional protocols such as the AUPSC.
97
 
                                                          
92
 Alemu (2008) p. 40. 
93
 Ben Kioko (2003) p. 812. 
94
 Alemu (2008) p. 136. 
95
AU Executive Council (March 2005) „Ezulwini Consensus‟ Ext/EX.CL/2(VII) The Ezulwini Consensus represents 
the common position held by the AU Executive Council on the proposed reform of the United Nations. 
96
 Alemu (2008) p. 137. 
97
 Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self Defence (2005) p. 115. 
27 
 
However such an invitation would only be valid as long as the consent is not withdrawn by the 
concerned state. Given that such a consensual engagement is only valid as long as it lasts
98
 
Moves by ROs to take security responsibility into their own hands and sometimes bypass UNSC 
authorization demonstrate the dwindling nature of the trust in the international peace and security 
machinery. As Arend observes, the conflict between the UN and ROs represents the tension in 
contemporary times between globalism and regionalism, and makes it more complicated to 
develop a well functioning international security system.
99
 
The difficulties of the global peace and security regime, and the sometimes troubled relationship 
with regional security organizations, pose a threat to future interventions to protect against 
violations of fundamental human rights and prevent civilian loss of lives. On the other hand, 
some ROs like the AU have demonstrated a lack of political will and the capacity to single 
handedly perform the role of maintaining peace and protecting the lives and rights of civilians. 
Such lack of will and capacity, coupled with the sometimes lack of cooperation between the UN 
and ROs has led to inactions in the face of massive violations in places like Darfur. This calls for 
a need for more cooperation and action in other to ensure protection of people from massive 
violation of their rights, and doing so in accordance with the Charter and principles of 
international law.  
3.3 Conclusion 
The events of the last more than two decades have left the question of HI widely open, and 
therefore back to the default position of prohibition except for the acceptable exceptions. And 
thus the extension of the UN traditional role of maintaining international peace and security to 
other situations such as humanitarian based interventions still undecided. Even the question of 
regional bodies acting in situations where there is urgent need for action and the UNSC has 
failed to act has been problematic. The problem with ROs‟ action has not only been limited to 
the conflict with the UN Charter and the UNSC powers, but also their lack of political will and 
capacity. This situation calls for the need to adopt a new structure to guide and govern 
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humanitarian forceful interventions. A new structure that would meet the demands for the 
changing dynamics of international relations and international law – from the understanding of 
sovereignty as a right to a more responsible sovereignty leading to respect for human rights.  A 


























CHAPTER IV: A LEX FERENDA VIEW BASED ON THE JUST 
WAR THEORY AND THE COSMOPOLITANT PERSPECTIVE 
As Frank and Zolo put it, interventions to protect peoples from the Venal acts of their 
government or rulers would have been „angelic interventions‟ if humans were angels. But since 
humans are humans and not angels, the other governments or coalition of governments who 
undertake to rescue peoples from the fangs of their government‟s brutality are equally subject to 
veniality.
100
 However, though humans are not angels, they are nevertheless rational beings 
capable of reason and acting morally, free from egoism and self interest. Hence Kant‟s 
categorical imperative: „Act so as to use humanity, whether in your own person or in others, 
always as an end and never as a means‟.
101
 There are ethical and moral standards of how an 
ideal scenario of HI ought to be. Based on these views I will in this chapter present an argument 
in favour of HI along the lines of the just war and cosmopolitan theories. This is in a bid to 
further bolster the argument for the need of a new, clear and consistent legal regime for the use 
of force to protect peoples suffering from gross human rights violations.  
Traditional JWT provides moral criteria for going to war and the conduct of war itself as it was 
in the ancient medieval period.
102
 However, JWT has evolved with time to meet the realities of 
contemporary warfare, as intrastate conflict which was not within the realm of the pioneer 
scholars on the theory have been taken into consideration in contemporary writings. JWT can 
still be said to be relevant today as it has evolved with time to meet with the realities of 
contemporary conflicts; from interstate conflicts as it was traditionally understood, to intrastate 
conflicts in contemporary times.   
On the other hand, the need to protect people from violent crimes, crimes against humanity and 
crimes of genocides is a universal obligation and a central idea in cosmopolitan ethics. Applying 
the theory of cosmopolitanism in defending HI will go a long way to further the just war 
arguments, and will provide an ideal scenario for its application. Despite the cosmopolitanism 
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ethical and universal obligation of nonmaleficence, Bohman and Lutz Bachman opine that: „If 
there is any room for coercion in cosmopolitan law, it is in enforcement of human rights 
precisely against States that use their sovereignty to abuse human rights‟.
103
  
4.1 Just War Theory: A moral criteria for Humanitarian Intervention 
JWT saw its first expression in ancient Christian theology and during the medieval period. The 
moral theory was pioneered by Catholic bishops based on natural law and Christian theology.
104
 
However, scholarship on the JWT has evolved with time to meet with the changing vagaries of 
armed conflicts. From the protestant theologian Ramsey in the 1960s to Walzer and his 
classification of JWT under a set of ideas (“the theory of aggression” and “the war convention”), 
the theory spiraled in other contemporary writings on the justification for the use of armed force 
when and where necessary and to ensure its proper conduct. It has equally been used by policy 
makers, and more recently reiterated by the US president Obama in his Nobel Peace Prize 
Speech to justify America‟s involvement and role in fighting terrorism and interventions to 
protect the rights of people around the world.
105
  Thus, the JWT is relevant to contemporary 
armed conflicts and has provided a moral criterion for humanitarian forceful intervention. 
 The development of JWT has been a complex one. Its variety of content from the different 
approaches, both Christian and secular, emphasizes the tension that its development has 
encountered. But as Turner observes, the just war approach to the ethics of the use of force 
necessitates the ongoing dialogue between the different approaches as a means of developing 
meaning out of the tradition for contemporary usage.
106
 The moral questions as to when and how 
to use force are reflective of contemporary positive international law on the use of force as 
enshrined in the UN Charter and the Geneva Conventions on war. I support the argument put 
forward by Turner, namely that just war principles should not be understood as if they were fixed 
for all time. Rather, by applying the wisdom they contain in a moral discourse of contemporary 
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armed conflicts, one may contribute to the development and enhancement of the tradition. 
However, as some scholars observed, the just war tradition has seldom been expressly referred to 
in the discussion and evaluation of HI, even though most arguments in the intervention literature 
fit the framework of the Just War tradition.
107
 It is very important to consider the moral and 
strategic questions of HI hand in hand since they are interconnected, though the tendency has 
been for most scholars to separate them.
108
 
The UN involvement either directly or indirectly in attempting to prevent a breach of 
international peace and security in places like Iraq (1990-1991 and 2002-2003) and Bosnia 
(1995), ushered in a commitment by the international community to cooperate and put an end to 
violent conflicts and increase human rights protection. However, a purely humanitarian motive is 
absent in most interventions, and this has raised concerns about the UN‟s dwindling role, 
especially in the second US led invasion of Iraq.
109
 This coupled with the lack of a strong and 
distinct legal character of the concept of HI has raised salient questions about the body charged 
with authorizing such interventions. As observed by Walzer, it is difficult to find examples of 
pure „so called‟ HI – the humanitarian aspect it is often one among several motives.
110
 The 
causes, motives, and outcomes of such interventions have often been characterized by 
contradictions, falsehood and uncertainties. But I believe that if HI is to be effective, it should be 
rooted and guided by the principles of JWT, no matter how difficult this may seem. I will in the 
following paragraphs discuss HI in the light of the just war criteria and the extent to which this 




                                                          
107
 Mona Fixdal and Dan Smith Humanitarian Intervention and Just War (1998) Mershon International Studies 
Review p. 283-284. 
108
 Ibid., 284. 
109
 David M. Malone The UN Security Council: From Cold War to the 21
st
 Century (2004) LYNNE RIENNER 
Publishers p. 1-2. 
110
 Michael Walzer Just and Unjust Wars (2006) ….. p. 101. 
32 
 
4.1.1 Jus ad bellum and Humanitarian Intervention 
The jus ad bellum doctrine of JWT deals with the elements to consider before resorting to the use 
of military force.
111
 Jus ad bellum has developed around a set of principles for justifying a resort 
to the use of armed force and they include: the just cause principle, the requirement for a proper 
authority, a right intention, that war must be undertaken only if there is reasonable hope for 
success, that it is proportionate, of a last resort, and is waged to achieve a peaceful outcome.
112
 I 
will now consider some of the elements in greater detail. 
The classical just cause principle that allowed the use of force for defense against wrongful 
attack, retaking something wrongfully taken, or punishment for evil has been narrowed down or 
redefined in contemporary writings to mean defense against the crime of aggression as Walzer 
puts it, or self defense as in contemporary positive international law (Article 51 of the Charter). 
However, in the last one and a half decades, the language of self defense has been gradually 
replaced by intervention for humanitarian reasons as a „just cause‟.
113
 Crimes of genocide and 
other massive violations of human rights seem to have qualified as a just cause in contemporary 
just war scholarship. However, while the events of the last two decades have put to bare the 
lapses in the international legal machinery, they have equally evidenced a serious rift between 
the moral/ethical and strategic concerns for resort to intervention by the international 
community. Most of such interventions have proved to be more for the strategic interests of the 
intervening states, than for the often advanced moral justifications.
114
 
Proponents of JWT hold that the UN could have intervened in Rwanda to stop the massacre that                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
the former government allowed or could not stop, and could equally have intervened earlier in 
Bosnia to prevent the massive loss of human life there. And so on. Most commentators in these 
cases observed that neither inaction nor neutrality is justified in the face of such horrid crimes.
115
 
In this regard, it has been observed that the gross human rights abuses perpetrated against the 
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Albanian population of Kosovo by the Serbian forces gave NATO a just cause to intervene.
116
 
However, the intervention by NATO raised questions as to who is the proper authority to 
authorize such interventions. It also brought to light the tension between self defense and HI as 
just cause criteria. As Atack illustrates, NATO might claim a just cause in bombing Serbia in the 
name of ending massive abuses of human rights, while Serbia might claim just cause in the name 
of self-defense against NATO‟s interference in its internal affairs without a UN authorization.
117
 
Hence, the need to consider the just cause criterion alongside other elements of JWT such as the 
right authority. This leads me to the next element of the just war theory, the question about who 
has the right to authorize such interventions. 
The classical, secular „state centered‟ just war theory looked upon the sovereign state as the 
legitimate authority to authorize any resort to armed force. This has changed from the essentially 
moral and theological expressions of the likes of Aquinas who believed legitimate authority 
belonged to the prince who received it from God.
118
 In contemporary times, with the dwindling 
role of state sovereignty in favour of protecting individual human rights, the agenda has changed. 
The just war tradition has evolved to accommodate modern day realities of armed conflict that 
piths the state against its subjects or some other form of intra-state conflicts. HI has been 
gradually added to self defense as the main just cause for resorting to the use of armed force.  
To the detriment of the perspective which holds that the state‟s role in international relations 
cannot be bypassed and that state sovereignty is absolute, internationalism recognizes the 
centrality of states and sovereignty, but stress the need for regulation of interstate relations and 
the moral, ethical and legal obligation to protect the human family from abuse of their 
fundamental rights wherever they may be. And so, if deemed necessary, intervention should be 
authorized by the society of states.
119
 Cosmopolitanism on its part takes a wider stance and 
considers the international system to consist of individuals rather than states. It views state 
sovereignty as a mere usurper of the rights of the world‟s citizens. Citing Reisman, Fixdal 
observes that sovereignty protected by international law is the peoples‟ sovereignty rather than 
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  Accordingly, internationalists and cosmopolitan scholars both 
agree that the UN is the model authority of the international society to be charged with this task. 
However, internationalist as well as cosmopolitan scholars still face a tough challenge as to who 
holds the ultimate right to authorize an external intervention?
121
 Should it ultimately remain the 
sole responsibility of the UN, or should other multilateral organizations like the EU, NATO, AU 
or even unilateral action from super powers such as the US come to the scene where the UN is 
unable or unwilling to sponsor the intervention? It is this back and forth debate from statism to 
cosmopolitanism and midway that has created a persistent dilemma. Even today, in the face of 
the frequent humanitarian crises and the dilemmas of intervention, there seem to exist no single 
right answer to the question as to who has authority.  However, as Fidal observes, both the 
willingness and right to intervene exists only in „rare circumstances‟, the first of such was in 
1991 when in the face of repression of the Iraqi civilian population, the UNSC passed Resolution 
688. Though the resolution did not provide for use-of force, it called on the Iraqi government to 
stop repression and allow foreign humanitarian organizations into the country.
122
 Most other 
situations have been controversial; characterized by delays and inaction on the part of the UN, 
and bypassing of the UN‟s authority by multilateral organizations like NATO and the US‟s 
unilateral actions. All these just go to show the need for an overhaul of the current state of 
affairs. Global think-tanks need to go back to the drawing table and reconsider strengthening the 
UN‟s authority, encourage multilateral cooperation with the UN, and institutionalize constraints 
on big states so as to stop them from exploiting intervention opportunities for self interest 
reasons. This leads me to the next element of the just war theory, the right intention. 
The motive for a decision to act on a just cause should be predicated on the creation of a just 
peace. According to the classical just war theorists, the motives to act on a just cause should be 
void of the cruel thirst for vengeance, the passion for inflicting harm, the fever for revolt, the lust 
for power and aggrandizement motives. Instead it should seek to achieve peace, punish evil doers 
and uplift the good.
123
 According to Augustine and as cited by Turner: “we do not seek peace in 
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order to be at war, but we go to war that we may have peace”.
124
 This standard has moved from 
its original purpose as used by medieval scholars to caution individual soldiers from fighting 
with wrong intentions, to cautioning sovereign authorities and the international community to 
ensure that the purpose of war is to be serving justice and achieving peace.
125
 Even though not 
explicitly specified under positive international law, the just war rhetoric of right intention is 
found in every discourse on HI and forms one of the key debates. As such, it is a source of 
disagreement on the right to intervention. 
As I mentioned earlier, the motive for actual use of armed force to protect foreign citizens is 
hardly ever purely humanitarian. Examples of interventions based on self interest motives 
abound. Scholars ascribe the Clinton administration‟s intervention in Haiti not to concerns for 
Haiti but for short-term political considerations in the US.
126
 Equally most post colonial 
interventions in Africa by former colonial masters, for example France‟s role in Rwanda in 1994, 
have been seen as void of purely humanitarian reasons but the continued desire to play the role 
of colonial master.
127
 Another issue that has highlighted the question of right intention is the 
inconsistency and selectivity of international actors. Why did the international community 
intervene in Bosnia but not in other war torn countries like Sudan? This inconsistency makes it 
difficult to know what exact motives drive the actors and as such leaves even well-intended 
actors open to criticism. It also exposes the weakness of the UN system with regards to its 
capacity of solely handling humanitarian forceful intervention.
128
 The right intention criterion is 
crucial in the development and institutionalization of HI. Therefore, as theological reasoning 
ordains a godly duty to mean well and the just war tradition on right intention to some extent 
harness the resort to force for ulterior motives, so too could international law institutionalize 
sanctions against self interest and discipline hypocritical actions in the use of armed force. 
I will now examine the last three criteria namely, reasonable hope for success, overall 
proportionality, and last resort jointly because they are considered to be additional measures to 
be applied when the above requirements are met. As Turner observes, religious just war theory 
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and international law do not address them specifically, yet they often figure in contemporary just 
war reasoning.
129
 Prominent has been the reasoning of contemporary just war theorists in 
redefining jus ad bellum as a jus contra bellum meaning a prima facie presumption against armed 
confrontations and using just war categories to deny the possibility of just war.
130
 They argue 
that with the destructive capabilities of contemporary weapons, there can be no reasonable hope 
for success, and that contemporary armed conflict can never reasonably be a last resort for 
serving justice, order and peace but will instead create more injustice and disorder.
131
  
However, as Turner argues, although such a presumption against the use of armed force appears 
in recent catholic thought on war, it does not feature in the classic just war tradition nor is it the 
view of Augustine and Aquinas who represent the classic catholic just war authorities. Rather, 
the concept of just war holds a presumption against injustices focusing on the need for 
responsible use of force in response to wrongdoing.
132
 Force according to the just war tradition is 
an instrument that may be good or evil depending on what use it is put to. And so the just war 
tradition specifies the terms under which the powers that be are authorized to resort to force to 
rectify injustices. The just war tradition is based on the assumption that harm has already been 
done and that the loss of value has already occurred (the just cause) prior to the consideration of 
whether force is justified to restore the original situation.
133
 
Proportionality as regards jus ad bellum means balancing the evil already done and the good/evil 
which the use of force might bring. Last resort requires that all peaceful methods must have been 
exhausted before the use of armed force can be justified. This in a way encapsulates JWT‟s 
moral presumption against use of armed force and its prudential and ethical imperatives. For 
example if diplomatic means could achieve the objectives just quickly and efficiently, or if 
delays in achieving objectives do not have a damaging effect then the costly and destructive 
military measures could cause more harm than good.
134
 However, some scholars have argued 
that outside intervention should come earlier rather than later in a conflict, citing the case of 
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Rwanda where late intervention proved fatal.
135
 Some argue that the alternatives to the use of 
armed force should be effective and quick, and should be morally less destructive than the use of 
armed force itself. For example economic sanctions might constitute a grosser violation of 
morality than forceful intervention itself as it might involve a systemic attack on civilians and 
noncombatants.
136
 As such, one can conclude that last resort not only requires that the 
alternatives to the use of force be effective and moral, but also that forceful measures be adopted 
immediately when the alternative peaceful measures fail to yield the required results. 
4.1.2 The Jus in Bello Criteria 
The Jus in Bello criteria of the just war theory is the second arm of the moral theory of just war, 
and it applies when the jus ad bellum criteria are met and the war is ongoing. In taking into 
account what is justified to do when using of force, two major criteria have been developed: (1) 
proportionality, which is avoiding needless destruction to achieve justified ends; (2) 
discrimination, which involves avoiding direct or intentional harm to non combatants
137
. These 
criteria on ensuring that war is fought in an organized manner, void of unwanted destructions and 
civilian casualties, only goes to emphasize the relevance of the principle to contemporary armed 
conflicts where rules are often disregarded.   
Faced with the indiscriminate destruction to property and the civilian casualties recorded during 
the world wars, the international community gave serious attention to updating rules for the 
conduct of war. This is evidenced by the signing of the Geneva Conventions and Protocols on 
the conduct of armed conflicts and other rules of humanitarian law. However, contemporary 
experiences of the conduct of war raise serious questions and doubts on whether such measures 
are effective. The high number of civilian casualties in recent civil wars, for example, in Sierra 
Leone, Liberia, and Sri Lanka, where nonconventional weapons were used against civilians, the 
widespread use of child soldiers and the voluntary targeting of civilians in Rwanda and Darfur 
etc, makes it hard to say if such rules of war can be effective. Even the most sophisticated of 
precision weapons such as those used in Afghanistan and Iraq cannot eliminate civilian 
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 And this situation is complicated by the use of „human shields‟ as a tactic in 
fighting. However, since it is often difficult to completely eliminate civilian casualties, the 
criterion of noncombatant immunity is often qualified with the principle of double effect in other 
for the JWT to overcome this difficulty. According to this principle, the death of civilians in a 
war can be morally excusable if it is not the intended consequence of war but merely an 
unfortunate byproduct. On the other hand, just as non-combatant casualties cannot be intended as 
the outcome of military action, they cannot be sought as a means to other military objectives.
139
  
The principle of discrimination together with its qualifications has been well regulated under 
international law in Protocol 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. This is to ensure that this 
cardinal and fragile principle of just war be closely monitored. In addition, the just cause and 
proportionality principles of the just war theory by themselves further qualify the principle of 
discrimination. That is, the war must be aimed at pursuing a just cause, and the good of waging 
the war must outweigh the evil of unintended casualties to innocent civilians.
140
 Further, as 
Walzer suggests, combatants have an additional positive responsibility to save civilian lives even 
if it means risking their own life, according to the principle of „due care‟
141
  
Having looked at the moral basis for resorting to the use of arms and the rules of engaging in an 
armed conflict, I will now move further to discuss ethical and political justifications for HI from 
a cosmopolitan perspective. 
4.2 The Cosmopolitanism Ideal 
Cosmopolitanism seems to idealize a world free from conflicts. The cosmopolitan ideal is 
compatible with JWT. The universality and respect for human rights characteristics, necessitates 
the use of force in some circumstances to protect these rights. Cosmopolitan scholars support the 
existing legal justification for HI, and advocate for a stronger and universal legal regime for 
intervention. Their ideal is a universal society with one world and one government. Radical 
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cosmopolitanism breaks the barrier of state sovereignty and regards all human occupants of the 
world as the major actors in the international community. 
According to some cosmopolitan scholars like David Held, human beings are all part of a 
universal moral community and all moral claims should be treated equally regardless of one‟s 
location or cultural and political affiliation.
142
 Based on this moral thesis, held by most 
cosmopolitans, some suggest a world government though some see this as a radical move and 
would prefer the strengthening of the current global moral and legal community.
143
 The ethical, 
moral and political dimensions of cosmopolitanism are important concerns in seeking to justify 
the need to protect individuals whose states or governments are unwilling or unable to protect 
them from gross violations of their rights. Nevertheless, this role of the international community 
to intervene in another state to protect and prevent crimes against people such as genocide and 
crimes against humanity, has been the basis of conflict between the cosmopolitan responsibility 
to protect and promote human rights due to their universality, and the obligation to respect state 
sovereignty as a basis for international order.
144
 However, in spite of the dilemma of protection 
of human rights, the need to respect sovereignty and the concerns about the destructive 
consequences of military action, the cosmopolitan ideal does not tolerate state involvement in 
human rights violation or state inability to prevent them.  
4.2.1 Characteristics of Cosmopolitanism 
Cosmopolitan ethical theories share three important characteristics namely: egalitarianism, 
individualism and universality. As Charvet puts it, there is an ideal universal moral order to 
which human beings are immediately members and share rights and duties amongst them.
145
 
Egalitarianism in this sense implies impartiality. According to Beitz, in a cosmopolitan order the 
choices about what policies and which institutions we should establish should be based on an 
impartial consideration of claims of each person who would be affected.
146
 This implies that if 
individuals are directly represented in making laws and directing policy at the international level, 
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then international law and policy will take into consideration their basic rights and freedoms. A 
core commitment of the cosmopolitan ethical perspective is the mutual respect for all persons 
and the recognition of the moral worth of each individual. 
The principle of universality is a cornerstone for cosmopolitan thinkers. Radical 
cosmopolitanism sees the state as a barrier to attaining the goals of „one world one government‟. 
Kantian idealism assumes the ability of human beings to determine universally valid moral laws 
through the exercise of reason, and their equal ability to act according to these laws.
147
 
According to Kant, the ideal world should be a „kingdom‟ of free rational beings equal in 
humanity, treated as ends in them no matter where they dwell.
148
 Honnett suggests that the equal 
and inalienable dignity of every human being exists independently of and prior to any particular 
legal or political order. And because of this community of the world‟s people, a transgression of 
rights in one place is felt everywhere.
149
 However, Kant‟s ideal of a universal and one moral 
world with individuals as the sovereigns has been put in more moderate terms by other scholars 
such as Shapcott. He opines in his discourse ethics that cosmopolitanism does not require the 
creation of a completely homogenous society but argues that individuals put in different contexts 
are capable of thinking in universalist terms and can determine norms which can be said to apply 
to all through debate and dialogue.
150
 However, despite the different approaches adopted by 
cosmopolitan scholars, they all have in common, a commitment to universality, egalitarianism 
leading to respect and protection of human rights at the global level. The increasing focus on 
respect and protection for human rights in contemporary international law and politics is an 
indication of the growing cosmopolitan world view. This is as human rights exist by virtue of the 
universal moral theory which postulates the whole world as one moral sphere.
151
 
Radical cosmopolitanism with its emphasis on universality and the preference for individual 
autonomy to any form of government or political order, can present a challenge to conventional 
political structures and theories
152
 as it emphasizes that individuals in a cosmopolitan society 
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have moral obligations and rights that transcend national boundaries. However, as Kant suggests 
in his „Perpetual Peace‟, the cosmopolitan order does not require dissolution of an international 
system based on states as a discrete political entity through the establishment of some sort of 
„super state‟. It however requires that states‟ behavior be circumscribed by international law.
153
 
And as also put forth by a moderate cosmopolitan view, cosmopolitanism need not be grossly 
universal to completely downplay the minimal legal principles that make possible the peaceful 
coexistence of peoples and states in a pluralistic society. And that any move to a cosmopolitan 
order would need to evolve from our current order.
154
  Contemporary cosmopolitan scholars have 
expanded on Kant‟s original vision of human rights as the domain of cosmopolitan law that 
institutionalizes basic human rights and the rule of law at the supranational level.
155
 From this 
perspective, cosmopolitan theorists see the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as the turning 
point and a model. They hold that the respect and protection of universal human rights is a 
fundamental obligation of all states and governments. It is suggested by some cosmopolitan 
scholars like Held and Garrett that the UN system could act as a transitional measure if it lived 
up to its charter. This would require enforcement of the prohibition of the discretionary right to 
use force and the implementation of the various conventions on human rights.
156
 The 
Cosmopolitan project however remains an ambitious one with divergent views on the modus 
operandi. While some scholars support a constitutionalism or a cosmopolitan law with an 
effective and accountable international police force to defend it others call for a cosmopolitan 
world ethic. However a complementary relationship between cosmopolitan law and world ethics 
as opined by Hans Kung cited by Atack could be a more favourable proposition.
157
 
4.2.2 Use of Force in a Cosmopolitan Society 
Besides the compelling moral and ethical obligations of the international community which are 
imposed by the emphasis on universality and indivisibility of human rights, the cosmopolitan 
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ideal finds the existing legal regime for humanitarian forceful intervention a useful interim 
measure. The cosmopolitan ideal gives the state the primary responsibility to protect its citizens 
from genocide, massive suffering, gross and systemic violations of their rights. If the state itself 
is said to be involved in perpetrating the abuses, the responsibility shifts to the international 
community.
158
 Under cosmopolitan law intervention in another state to protect human rights is a 
fundamental obligation of all states and is in line with the just war principle of just cause. As 
Bohman and Lutz Bachman suggest, “If there is any room for coercion in cosmopolitan law, it is 
in the enforcement of human rights precisely against states that use their sovereignty to abuse 
human rights”.
159
 Besides being a moral obligation, cosmopolitan scholars align themselves with 
the current regime of HI as provided under exceptions to the principle of non-use of force, 
Article 2(4). The UNSC authorization of the use of force to maintain or restore international 
peace and security (Article 42 of UN Charter) thus seemingly serves as a temporary and 
transitory measure to the ideal and autonomous regime advocated by cosmopolitans. 
According to the cosmopolitan model of constitutionalism or cosmopolitan law, the coercive 
powers for forceful intervention to prevent acts of genocide are managed by a cosmopolitan 
institution based on world citizenship, not by existing states.
160
 An effective and accountable 
international police force is necessary to ensure an organized intervention. The determination of 
a right and just authority to order and organize intervention is necessary for such to be justified 
under cosmopolitan law. According to many cosmopolitan scholars, the current UN system if 
well organized and respected could act as a model for a world government, and a reformed 
UNSC could effectively approve intervention. 
The cosmopolitan ideal of restraint during the conduct of armed conflict is compatible with the 
just war elements of discrimination and proportionality to ensure a fair, just and proportionate 
use of armed force to achieve the intended results of lasting peace. Nevertheless, the 
cosmopolitan claim for morality which reaches beyond boundaries is often tested by the realities 
of armed conflict as it is often difficult there to maintain the sense of shared humanity with the 
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 This is especially seen in contemporary intra state armed conflicts and other forceful 
external interventions where civilian casualties are rife due to „collateral damages‟, deliberate 
targeting, use of noncombatants as instruments and objectives of warfare, gross abuses and 
crimes against humanity often perpetrated by both government and opposition groups as was the 
case in the Balkans, Rwanda, Somalia, Darfur, Sri Lanka and so on.
162
 Such restraints in the 
conduct of armed conflict are made possible by the acceptance and acknowledge of the 
cosmopolitan approach and built on the cosmopolitan ethical foundation as espoused by Erskine 




Cosmopolitanism and JWT are compatible and even complementary in nature. They both 
acknowledge the need to use force to protect human rights of people whose governments are 
unwilling or unable to do so. They equally acknowledge the need for a universal and just 
authority to authorize such use of force. And to this effect, they view a well representative and 
well organized UNSC as such ideal authority. As such, the cosmopolitan and just war 
perspective would regard the current exceptions to the principle of non-use of force under Article 
2(4) of the UN Charter especially with respect to the UNSC mandate under Article 39, as 
important transitory measures to the ideal humanitarian forceful intervention regime they 
advocate for. Nevertheless, applying the current UN mandate under Article 39 to use of force for 
humanitarian reasons has been challenging. It is not one of the exceptions to Article 2(4), neither 
has there emerged an acceptable practice to be called customary law.  Also, most controversies 
in this domain of international law have been centered on the lack of strict respect for some 
normative and precautionary standards of use of force, embodiments of cosmopolitanism and 
JWT. This is seen in the inconsistency in determining threshold for intervention, the lack of 
respect for authority, the lack of proportionality in the resort to force, self interest-motivated 
interventions leading to double standards, etc. This has posed enormous challenges to the 
doctrine of use of force and the current UN mandate, and has led to the move to adopt a new 
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approach under the R2P concept. Therefore, put together, the cosmopolitan ideal principles and 
the JWT will be useful ingredients in my attempt to make a case for a new legal regime for use 
of force to protect foreign citizens. The moral and ethical ideals and the philosophical 
implications of the theories of just war and cosmopolitanism discussed above, and coupled with 
the weaknesses of the current legal regime of HI as seen in the previous chapter, give credence to 






















CHAPTER V: THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT PROJECT: A NEW 
LEGAL REGIME? 
The emergence of the R2P doctrine with its foundation in moral and ethical principles of just war 
and cosmopolitanism is evidence of the will to do good to protect and promote the dignity of the 
human family. R2P emerged as a desperate attempt by the international community to salvage 
the battered image of the predecessor regime of HI. It is commonly referred to as the „R2P 
Project‟ presumably because it is still undergoing development and more work is still to be done 
to properly define and operationalise same. The basis of the concept is presented in the 2001 
ICISS Report titled The Responsibility to Protect. The commission was an initiative of the 
Canadian government in September 2000 after a call from the then UNSG Kofi Anan. The 
phrase R2P has largely replaced HI in the discourse on intervention for humanitarian reasons. 
There is a gradual move towards reconceptualising and reforming the approach to HI. There is 
also a growing change in the understanding of humanitarian forceful interventions from „right to 
intervene‟ to a „responsibility to protect‟ of each state and the international community.  R2P as a 
legal notion is the idea that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens 
from avoidable catastrophes such as mass murder and rape, and other gross violation of 
international human rights and humanitarian law. However, if they are unwilling or otherwise 
fail to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states.
164
 
The underlying principle of R2P is that state sovereignty implies responsibility, and that primary 
responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself. Furthermore, it is said that 
where a population is suffering serious harm as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or 
state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of 
non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.
165
 There is an ongoing 
debate on the R2P project as to whether it is the way forward for intervention in another state for 
humanitarian reason. The question is whether R2P is the new legal regime for HI by stretching 
the UN mandate under Article 39 or whether it may turn into an adjustment of Article 2(4) of the 
Charter, or as a new exception to this provision. My discussions in this part of my thesis will 
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focus more on R2P as an emerging legal norm for use of force for humanitarian reasons, and less 
on the integrated, political approach of responsibility to prevent, responsibility to react and 
responsibility to rebuild as presented by the ICISS Report. I will therefore only present a short 
description of the responsibility to prevent and rebuild.  
5.1 Evolution 
The statement of the former UNSG Kofi Annan in his address to the 54
th 
session of the UN 
General Assembly was quite illuminating and promising on the question of HI. In view of the 
conflicts surrounding the principles of sovereignty/non-intervention and intervention for 
humanitarian reasons; coupled with conflicting legal dispensations; the UNSG advocated for 
consensus between states to protect fundamental values of humanity.
166
 He reminded the world 
of the failures of the international community in places like Rwanda and Bosnia, and challenged 
member states to find common grounds to uphold the Charter. He challenged state sovereignty as 
being redefined by the forces of globalization and international cooperation, according to him: 
„the state is now widely understood to be the servant of its people and not vice versa‟.
167
 He 
emphasized that the changes in world geopolitics, economics and technology requires the UN to 
adapt to a world of new actors, new responsibilities and new possibilities to peace and progress. 
To this end, the SG challenged the UNSC and the UN as a whole to forge unity behind the 
principle that massive and systemic violations of human rights, wherever they may take place, 
should not be allowed.
168
 In his Millennium Report to the UN, the UNSG restated the dilemma 
of HI as follows: 
“… if humanitarian intervention is indeed an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should 
we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systemic violations of human rights that 
offend every precept of our common humanity?”
169
 
The Canadian government responded to this call by initiating the ICISS, an International Panel 
of Experts to engage in finding solutions to this problem.
170
 After a series of consultations with 
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governments, international governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, and 
scholars, the result was the final report entitled Responsibility to Protect.
171
 This report raised 
debates and disagreements between states, and led to a more cautious approach by the UNSG in 
his own 2004 report: A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility where he endorsed the 
R2P norm for protection from genocide, large scale killings, ethnic cleansing and other serious 
violation of human rights and humanitarian law.
172
 The UNSG‟s High-Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change equally endorsed the emerging norm of R2P. Many states at the UN 
World Summit of political leaders in 2005 endorsed the norm as well.
173
 At the close of the 
Summit, while acknowledging the primary responsibility of the concerned state to protect its 
citizens, and stressing the need for the General Assembly to continue deliberations on the R2P 
question, the world leaders addressed the question of international responsibility to protect as 
follows:  
“…we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the 
Security Council in accordance with the UN Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case by case 
basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful 
means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly failing to protect their populations from 
genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”
174
 
The consensus arrived at the 2005 World Summit and the formal recognition of the doctrine of 
R2P by the UNSC and world leaders has been widely acclaimed despite the professed gaps in its 
present status and in the operationalisation of the concept.
175
 The UNSC in Resolution 1674 from 
2006 reaffirms paragraphs 38 and 39 of the outcome document of the World Summit, on the 
responsibility to protect populations from mass murder and humanitarian catastrophes.
176
 In its 
Resolution 1706 from 2006 concerning the situation in Darfur, the UNSC, when authorizing the 
deployment of a UN peacekeeping force, also recalled its endorsement of the outcome of the 
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2005 World Summit in its Resolution 1674.
177
 The R2P doctrine and the standards adopted at the 
World Summit have been subject of further debate at the UN General Assembly and other 
international governmental and non-governmental fora in a bid to establish and consolidate its 
actual meaning, legal status and implementation. The current UN SG Ban Ki Moon has pledged 




5.2 Responsibility to Protect: The new approach 
The new approach re-conceptualizes the use of force by the international community to halt a 
humanitarian crisis from HI to R2P. In so doing, it attributed primary responsibility upon the 
sovereign government for taking action to prevent a humanitarian crisis. Only when that 
responsibility has not been exercised would the international community under the auspices of 
the UNSC engage its responsibility to intervene for the sake of humanity.
179
 The ICISS Report 
proposed that three forms of responsibility be engaged; (1) the responsibility to prevent: 
addresses both the root causes and direct causes of internal conflict and other human made crises 
that put populations at risk, and adopt  preventive strategies such as good governance and respect 
for human rights; (2) responsibility to react: involves actively responding to situations of 
compelling human need with appropriate measures such as diplomacy, economic means and in 
extreme cases military intervention, and finally, a (3) responsibility to rebuild: provides, 
particularly after a military intervention, full assistance with recovery, reconstruction and 
reconciliation, addressing the causes of the harm which the intervention was designed to halt or 
avert.
180
 This tripartite approach seems to provide an integrated response to internal conflicts. It 
includes preventive measures to limit the occurrence of such gross violation of human rights, the 
resort to measures that allow a non-militarily and militarily response when need arises, and 
finally ensure post conflict peace building measures. Below, i will limit my discussion to the 
responsibility to react arm of the R2P project.  
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Inspired by the jus ad bellum principles of the JWT, the R2P demands new criteria for military 
intervention as proposed in the 2001 ICISS report and later endorsed by the International Panel 
of Experts in their 2004 report.
181
 The recommended criteria for military intervention include the 
following: 
a) A Just Cause: According to the commission‟s report, the just cause threshold requires 
that there is proof of occurrence of a genocide or large scale ethnic cleansing etc, as a result of a 
deliberate action of the state involved or its inability or failure to act. The commission‟s 
intention is to allow intervention only in situations of extreme need and irreparable harm so as 
to limit the exceptions to the principle of non-intervention.
182
  
b) Proper Intention: The primary purpose of intervention must be to halt humanitarian 
catastrophes and anything short of or further than that, for example „regime change‟ or 
„territorial occupation‟ is not prima facie justified. However, the report goes further to state that 
disabling the regime‟s capacity to harm its people may be essential to discharging the mandate 
of protection and that any unavoidable occupation of territory must be subject to returning the 
territory to its sovereign owners at the end of hostilities. To ensure that the right intention 
criterion is satisfied, the ICISS report advices that the intervention be carried out on a 
multilateral basis, with regional support and direct support of the people concerned.
183
  
c) Last Resort: Military intervention must be a last resort; all other peaceful means such as 
negotiations, ceasefires, and peacekeeping operations must have been explored.
184
  
d) Proportionality and Reasonable Prospects:  Military action is permissible only if it is 
carried out with the minimum scale, duration and intensity necessary to secure the humanitarian 
objective, and should ensure a maximum possibility of success if it is to be justified. If the 
intervention results in more harm than good, it is not considered justified.
185
   
e) Right Authority: The question of who has the authority to order intervention is crucial 
for the future of R2P. The ICISS as well as the Panel of Experts acknowledge that the UNSC is 
the ideal institution to authorize such sensitive critical actions. Though they equally 
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acknowledge the need for cooperation with ROs, and the inherent weaknesses present in the 
current role of the UNSC, they rather recognize a need for the Council to work better, than a 
need for replacing it.
186
  
The idea behind these new criteria for intervention as explained by the panel of experts, is to 
ensure that the decisions of the collective security system under the UNSC are not only seen as 
legal but also legitimate - that is being made on solid evidentiary grounds, and for the right 
reasons morally and legally.
187
 The panel equally suggests that for such important decisions of 
the UNSC to be made better and be better substantiated and communicated, it is important for 
the Council to adopt and systematically address a set of agreed guidelines. These are then meant 
to guide the Council in deciding whether or not to use force. According to the panel of experts, 
such guideline should not necessarily be meant to determine whether force can legally be used, 
but whether as a matter of good conscience and good sense it should be.
188
  
5.3 R2P: A Panacea for the Humanitarian Intervention Dilemma? 
R2P can be considered a cosmopolitan project that has culminated from the progressive and near 
universal acceptance of human rights protection as a priority for all. The idea of protecting 
people from the brutal acts of their government cannot be achieved without compromising the 
state sovereignty principle. International law has been in favour of the non-intervention principle, 
and its derived principle of non-use of force which can only be violated by the use of armed 
force in exceptional circumstances as seen above. However, international law has seen some 
inclination towards respect and protection of human rights against the strict respect for the state 
sovereignty principle. But this has not come without resistance from states, especially weaker 
states that see interventionism as an excuse for stronger states to meddle into their affairs in order 
to protect their own interests.  
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5.3.1 The R2P Principle is full of challenges 
This dilemma of state sovereignty and the need for interventionism, the inherent constraints in 
international law making and the possibility of abuse by intervening states or bodies have 
hampered the development of the law of HI. The emergence of the new doctrine of R2P has been 
welcomed by many as a possible panacea to the HI dilemma, but with all the surrounding 
uncertainties, it would be challenging to make a case for it as representing „de lege lata‟.  
The first major problem is its conflict with the sovereignty and non-intervention principles. The 
principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention remain until the present date, the principal 
guarantors of global legal order. Its replacement by a clear and distinct legal regime for 
intervention might jeopardize this world order strenuously put in place by the international 
community over a long time. And if this order is to be compromised, it would presumably 
require an exceptional commitment, a greater resolve and stringent guiding principles to be 
followed by state parties to ensure that such intervention is carried out in good faith based on a 
just cause. Smaller and weaker states have been very critical of any further move to interfere 
with the Charter provisions and the provisions of the 1970 UN Declaration of Friendly Relations 
on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among 
States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. To them, the sovereignty and non-
intervention principles are the only guarantees for their protection and autonomy from stronger 
states that might use the R2P principle as an open window to go in and out of a state as it suits 
their whims and caprices. To these states the principle of sovereignty equally ensures recognition 
of their equal worth and dignity, a protection of their unique identities and national freedom and 
the affirmation of their right to determine their own future.  
The established principle in Article 2 (1) of the UN Charter is seen as a means to ensure the 
protection of the sacred values of international relations that allow equal existence and co-
existence. Even the drafters of the R2P report recognize the importance of this core principle of 
international relations.
189
 This protective stance adopted by developing states was reflected in the 
negotiations preceding the 2005 World Summit as they objected to the UNSC authority to 
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authorize coercive measures in matters within their borders.
190
 The Algerian Permanent 
Representative is quoted as saying in a discussion on the UNSG‟s 2005 Report „In Larger 
Freedom‟ that: 
 “…interference can occur with the consent of the state concerned… we do not deny that the 
United Nations has the right and duty to help suffering humanity. But we remain extremely 
sensitive to any undermining of our sovereignty, not only because sovereignty is our last defense 
against the rules of an unequal world, but because we are not taking part in the decision making 
process of the Security Council…”.
191
 
Further debates at the UNGA, such as those on the 2009 UNSG‟s report on implementing R2P, 
have seen a cautious approach to the sovereignty and intervention dilemma, especially from 
many developing states. They consider sovereignty as inviolable and that any intervention should 
be permissible only upon invitation of the state concerned. And even when they choose to 
support the principle they do so cautiously.
192
 This sort of precautious attitude of states when it 
comes to the sovereignty and intervention question shows how delicate this area of international 
law is. Even the cautious support by a majority of states at the World Summit and during the 
UNGA debates that followed could be attributed to the fact that R2P is considered by some as 
soft law. And that they could shy away when it comes to taking legally binding dispositions and 
implementations. 
The next difficult question in relation to the R2P regime is its current legal standing and its 
possibility of becoming hard law, should it not already constitute this. In the 2009 UNGA debate 
on the SG‟s report on implementation of the R2P, the Assembly president was quick to remark 
that R2P had no binding status in international law and that there had been no genuine agreement 
as to its terms.
193
 This sort of reservation only echoes the fact that R2P is yet to mature as a 
binding principle in international law and that much still needs to be done to achieve the required 
binding consensus. Although some member states accept R2P as an evolving norm of 
                                                          
190
 Spencer (2010) p. 513. 
191
 Ibid Spencer, citing Abdallah Baali, Permanent Representative of Algeria‟s  Statement to the informal Thematic 
Consultations of the General Assembly to discuss Secretary General‟s Report „In Larger Freedom‟.  
192





international law and even as one that could possibly be inferred from the UN Charter, others see 
it as a mere political commitment that has no specific legal content or obligation.
194
 
Some hold that HI already exists as law within the scope of UN Charter. Proponents for this 
argument such as the UK in its post Iraq and Kosovo intervention, view HI or the intervention to 
protect civilians as not falling within the scope of the prohibition on the use-of force under 
Article 2(4) of the Charter, based on their own interpretation of that provision.  According to 
them, Article 2(4) of the Charter has evolved with time to exclude forceful interventions in cases 
of extreme humanitarian need from its prohibition. This would be the case as long as the use of 
force is not directed against the territorial integrity or political independence of a state, and is 
necessary to protect human rights, which is consistent with the Charter‟s fundamental purpose.
195
 
Others who support R2P as an existing legal norm argue that the interpretation of Article 39 
could be stretched to provide the UNSC powers to authorize intervention when the prerequisite 
requirements for intervention under R2P are met, i.e. presumably where the situation does not 
strictly constitute a threat to international peace and security. The Council has in the past 
interpreted such crimes as a threat to or breach to international peace and security and has 
correspondingly taken necessary action.
196
 Such gaps between the law and practice only reveal 
the need for a well established and consistent approach. 
Even though the above arguments are plausible, it is a well known fact that R2P for the moment 
has no place in international treaty law. Instead, the explicit prohibition on intervention in the 
Charter and the later UN Declaration on Friendly Relations from 1970, were both aimed at 
protecting smaller or weaker states from frivolous interference with their internal affairs.
197
 
Admittedly, treaty provisions have the ability to change over time through the practice of states 
as per Article 31 (3) (a) of the VCLT. 
Also, prior to the Libyan intervention, R2P had so far not been invoked to justify collective use 
of force, and so there is very little development of the concept under customary international 
law. Even proponents of the principle aim to distinguish it from the old HI regime, thus severing 
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any alleged connections between the two that could have constituted state practice. Actually, 
even the alleged existence of consistent customary practice on HI has been disputed. The legal 
justifications for interventions by states themselves have been far from clear, they are often 
mixed with political and security concerns. Also, the limited development of case law by 
international courts and tribunals, and the often conflicting stances by the UNGA and the UNSC 
leaves the former HI regime more obscure.
198
 
However, as much as there exist objections to the legal character of the R2P regime, such 
objections might not necessary be against interventions as such but to other circumstances 
surrounding the exercise of such a right. Popular amongst these is the argument that HI is a 
„right‟ claimed by strong states against the weak.
199
 That argument would also fit R2P. The 
question for example as to who authorizes such an intervention is settled by the recommendation 
of both the ICISS and the International Panel of Experts‟ report proposing the UNSC as the best 
organ to take charge of such exceptional measures. However, the problem doesn‟t stop here; 
even the ICISS questioned the authority and credibility of the Council.
200
 The UNSC in its 
present composition has been blamed for inactions that have marred the intervention regime. The 
use of the veto power has stopped or delayed possible interventions to rescue civilians in the 
past, and could still be a threat to the R2P regime. Equally, the report observes the lack of 
political will by the Council, its uneven performance, the unrepresentative membership and the 
often double standards of the five veto powers as inherent flaws of the Council‟s functionality. 
These are some of the reasons why smaller and weaker states are concerned about the 
effectiveness of the UNSC and are calling for reform. An example is the declaration by the 
Algerian Permanent Representative quoted above. But a proposed reform of the UNSC, 
especially as to rules concerning the use of the veto power, has not been welcomed by the five 
permanent members. The ability for the veto powers to obstruct such changes using their powers 
under Articles 108 and 109 (2) poses a big challenge.
201
 Equally, there has been no consensus on 
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Another issue that has been raised is what should be the threshold for intervention and who 
should determine such? This is a very critical issue when it comes to determine when it is right to 
intervene in a given crisis. The ICISS proposed as just cause threshold for intervention that there 
is evidence of large scale loss of life, genocide or large scale ethnic cleansing or other serious 
violation of international humanitarian law actually taking place or being about to take place. 
Additionally, the sovereign government must have proved unable or unwilling to prevent it. 
These criteria have been widely approved. However, critics of this doctrine have raised the 
problem whereby the intervening powers carry on their act in circumstances where the facts do 
not support the intervener‟s assertion of a humanitarian crisis.
203
 The US intervention in Iraq in 
2003 exposed the weakness of indiscriminate intervention when proper evidence of the existence 
of circumstances to warrant intervention is missing, when no weapons of mass destruction were 
found or no links to Al-Qaeda were established.
204
 The skepticism created by the invasion of Iraq 
as to the threshold for intervention, has not been assuaged by the coming of R2P. The issue of 
proper instruments
205
 and what institution in each case should determine when a particular 
situation justifies intervention has not been settled by the Commission. The recent UNSC 
sanctioned intervention to protect civilians in Libya has further brought to light such worries. 
Finally, the establishment of the R2P doctrine, however well-intentioned, could be hampered by 
the poor precedence of past interventions characterized by inconsistency, self interest motives 
and double standards of the intervening powers. Prior to the Libyan intervention, some legal 
scholars expressed their worry over the issue of lack of congruence of action with existing law, 
and shared norms. Such fears being inferred from the past US and UK led actions in Iraq in 2003 
and the NATO actions in Kosovo in 1999 - all actions arguably violating existing rules.
206
 Thus 
the emphasis on the need for a sense of obligation amongst states and a commitment to act 
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according to established law.
207
 This is the crucial gap which the new R2P regime needs to fill in 
order to be dissociated with the former regime for HI that was marred by inconsistency and 
unevenness. This is an issue I will echo a bit more in chapter VII. 
The critics of the R2P totally castigate the idea of a new legally binding norm for intervention 
which would undermine the sovereignty principle. They worry that such would lead to the 
legitimization of a unilateral and unbalanced right to use force by powerful states against small 
and weak states.
208
 According to them, it is preferable to maintain the ambiguous nature of the 
present regime of HI and thus allow for a flexible „case by case‟ evolution of a consensus on HI 
amongst the world community.
209
 
5.3.2 Despite the challenges, a case may be made for R2P 
5.3.2.1 R2P: Political commitment to act on shared moral beliefs 
R2P is a cosmopolitan project rooted in the increasingly shared understanding that human rights 
are one and indivisible, and as such a violation in one place could be felt everywhere. This is in 
the spirit of the cosmopolitan ideal of equality of human rights, egalitarianism, and universality. 
The 1948 United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, recognized by many states and 
incorporated in their national constitutions, is an indication of such universality of human rights 
since at least the middle of the last century. Various categories of human rights have been 
incorporated in many conventions and ratified by states: the 1966 UN Convention on Civil and 
Political Rights, the 1948 Genocide Convention and so on. The international commitment to 
guarantee respect and protection of human rights and the elimination of genocidal crimes is not a 
novelty in international law. The R2P doctrine is merely an extension of such a commitment. 
The near global acceptance of UN authority with respect to interventions to protect people from 
gross violations of their rights, crimes against humanity and genocide, despite some reservations, 
emphasizes such universality and the need for a consistent, coherent and global approach 
towards such delicate problems of the international community. 
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R2P is equally rooted in and guided by the moral principles of engaging in the use of armed 
force as enshrined in the principles of JWT. As indicated above, the use of force under 
cosmopolitan law can only be permitted if such is meant to protect people from the brutality of 
their own states, and that such use of force should be guided by the moral principles of engaging 
in warfare. R2P clearly endorses this by institutionalizing JWT. This is a step beyond the 
traditional international law rules on the use of armed force which, though often reflecting such 
principles has not expressly referred to them. Having institutionalized JWT, the R2P regime is 
moving towards transforming the existing legal regime for intervention which has been criticized 
for its lack of coherence and for being based on achieving the interests of the strong nations 
against the weak.  If applied according to its standards, it could transform HI into „angelic 
interventions‟ to save the lives of innocent civilians at risk of their states‟ failure or inability to 
protect them.  
The just cause threshold of genocide, large scale killings, ethnic cleansing or other serious 
violation of international humanitarian and human rights law, according to the ICISS report and 
the report of the International Panel of Experts, will warrant the use of military force only as an 
exceptional and extraordinary measure.
210
 The delicate nature of the resort to military force, its 
destructive capabilities, could be of more harm than good to the people it is meant to protect and 
this is the reason why the threshold for intervention is raised to a high bar. This coupled with the 
inviolability of the concept of sovereignty and the need for it to be upheld, have led policy 
makers to allow interventions only as an exceptional measure.  
Equally, in the spirit of JWT, an intervention on a just cause should be sanctioned by a right 
authority. And according to the ICISS, that right authority should be based on a reformed UNSC 
rather than an alternative to it.
211
 From the above analysis it is clear that the issue of the UNSC 
authority is not the major problem, but rather that there is need for it to be reformed to meet with 
demands of contemporary global security and fairness. This could not only provide enhanced 
legitimacy, but equally a clearer and more consistent approach to all cases where forceful 
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intervention is necessary. The problem remains how such a reform could be realistically 
achieved. 
As rightly stated in the ICISS report, „finding a consensus about intervention is not simply a 
matter of deciding who should authorize it and when it is legitimate to undertake. It is also a 
matter of figuring out how to do it so that decent objectives are not tarnished by inappropriate 
means‟.
212
 Enforcing decisions on intervention in the past have attracted a lot of criticisms due to 
the inappropriate means adopted. And this has caused even well intended objectives to be blurred 
by hasty decisions to intervene without any hope of success, and the lack of respect for 
proportionality often leads to additional and unnecessary suffering among the people. It can be 
said that the internal function and the enforcement of UNSC decisions have provided even more 
controversy. This has been attributed to the failure of UNSC consensus on intervening to protect 
people in situations where they should have intervened, and the lack of international support for 
the Council‟s decisions to intervene forcefully whenever it has managed to go that far. 
In seeking to solve this problem, the R2P regime addresses which other considerations the 
UNSC may take into account besides threshold, prior to authorizing any interventions. The High 
Level Panel suggests that this could be in the form of agreed guidelines adopted and addressed 
by the Council in deciding whether or not to use force.
213
 However, the point of adopting such 
guidelines, according to the panel, must not be to guarantee that the objectively best outcome 
will always prevail. These considerations include as mentioned above: proper intention, last 
resort, proportionality and the hope for success. It is hoped that if decisions of the UNSC to use 
military force are based on such considerations, they could ensure a higher degree of success, 
continuity and reliability. 
I find the need to seek peaceful means to settle conflicts in the spirit of the R2P regime a 
worthwhile attempt to mitigate civilian casualties. This is exemplified by the „last resort and 
proportionality‟ conditions in resorting to military force. All other peaceful means of settling the 
conflict such as negotiations, diplomacy, ceasefire agreements, sanctions, peace keeping 
missions, and other forms of international pressure must have been sought or deemed insufficient 
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before any resort to the use of military force may be undertaken. This as mentioned earlier is the 
spirit of JWT‟s moral presumption against war and its prudential and ethical imperatives. This 
need to explore all other peaceful means before resorting to armed force is nothing new in the 
international law on the use of armed force. The R2P concept in this sense reaffirms Article 41 of 
the UN Charter which prescribes the use of such measures not involving the use of force in 
maintaining or restoring international peace and security and further emphases in the opening 
statement of Article 42 the need to exhaust such measures before resorting to force.
214
 However, 
if all such peaceful means are exhausted and do not achieve the intended results of stopping 
civilian repression and killing, then such use of force which only target combatants, and which is 
proportionate to the humanitarian outcomes, can be allowed. However it is also argued that 
forceful measures should come earlier than later in a humanitarian crisis. The pro and con 
arguments for last resort could be deeply divided, however, I believe that any intervention to 
protect civilians in a conflict should not wait until the last hour like was the case in Rwanda, but 
come in earlier in order to avert a regrettable loss of life. 
5.3.2.2 Understanding sovereignty as responsibility 
Sovereignty as seen above plays a vital role in balancing the overwhelming inequalities that 
characterize the existing system of states and ensures equality in international relations. 
However, overreliance on respecting the state sovereignty principle could risk allowing gross 
violations of human rights within states. The notion of sovereignty has indeed changed over time 
with the emergence of human rights and the growing complexities of international security.  
There has been an ongoing debate since the beginning of the 21
st
 century on whether the 
protection of human rights should perhaps be regarded as having equal weight with the principles 
of sovereignty and nonintervention.
215
 In this light, some scholars have interpreted the first three 
words of the preamble of the Charter, „we the peoples‟ to express the fact that the UN was not 
dedicated exclusively to the realization of interests and concerns of states, but that the activity of 
the state is also bound by its responsibility towards the people who inhabit it.
216
 The R2P project 
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has given more light and laid the ground work towards a possible change in the normative 
understanding of sovereignty in this direction. 
There has been a continuous call in recent times for a change in the understanding of the notion 
of sovereignty from a right to control, to more of an obligation to respect the rights and dignity 
of the people within the state, while equally upholding the sovereignty of other states.
217
  Kofi 
Annan in his 1999 address to the GA as cited above emphasized the changing role of states from 
merely being the masters, to being the servants of their people, and that individual sovereignty 
has been enhanced by the growing respect for human rights. By this the UNSG must have 
replicated some of the elements of Rousseau‟s social contract theory wherein he postulates a 
system whereby individuals unite in a society by mutual consent, agree to give up sovereignty to 
an authority in return for social order, and where the sovereign should be committed to the good 
of the individuals who constitute it.
218
 Such a contractual relationship must equally be guided by 
mutual respect of each others‟ rights and obligations.  
The early signals for a change in the understanding of the concept of sovereignty in the post cold 
war era were received after the Deng Commission‟s findings on the growing number of 
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) as a result of the upsurge of armed conflict within states.
219
 
Deng and his colleagues pioneered the acknowledgement of sovereignty as responsibility, when 
they ensured recognition of the primary responsibility for protecting IDPs lying with the host 
government.
220
 The US and UK foreign policies in the late 1990s and early 2000s have been 
guided by the idea of „contingent sovereignty‟, the idea that sovereign rights are not absolute but 
dependent on the observance of fundamental state obligations,
221
 though this idea been criticized 
for its selectivity and bias towards the third world.  Equally, the AU‟s development in the 1990s 
of the right to intervention echoed this shift towards sovereignty as responsibility within the 
African context. 
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Annan‟s challenge to world leaders for achieving consensus was taken up by the Canadian 
government when it initiated the ICISS and the R2P report published thereafter. The report allots 
the primary responsibility to the state for protecting its people and when the state is unable or 
unwilling to protect its people from serious violations, non-intervention yields to the 
international responsibility to protect. However, this understanding of sovereignty as being 
conditional on responsibility has met with resistance. Only after protracted debates preceding the 
2005 World Summit and after compromises from the various actors did the states arrive at a 
consensus. However, despite raising the threshold for intervention higher than originally 
proposed by the ICISS, amongst other things, the consensus favoured a more „responsible‟ 
notion of sovereignty.
222
 The adoption by a great majority of states of the R2P concept at the 
summit meant an acceptance to uphold sovereignty not only with its endowed rights to control 
but equally with the ensuing responsibilities towards the citizens of that state and the 
international community at large. This near universal adoption and acclamation of R2P equally 
marked an important milestone in its normative recognition.
223
 
5.3.2.3 Progress towards legal recognition?  
Though the R2P concept would seem to remain non-legally binding, there have been significant 
steps towards its legal recognition. Some scholars even argue that despite it not being agreed 
upon and ratified in treaty form, it has met with other significant criteria in international law. 
First, as an emerging legal norm, R2P like most legal norms is rooted in a shared normative 
understanding.  Generally, legal norms do not come out of nowhere, they are rooted in shared 
social understandings, and if accompanied by other criteria of legality such as generality, 
prohibiting or permitting certain conduct, non-retroactivity, clarity, and promulgation, it can be 
called law.
224
 Legal norms such as the emerging R2P arise when shared normative 
understandings evolve to meet the criteria of legality, as per Jutta and Stephen‟s „interactional‟ 
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account of international law.
225
  This kind of shared understanding and need has been considered 
in the development of R2P as a legal norm. And one needs not overemphasize the fact that the 
need for a novel concept or approach to the protection of civilians has been highly and widely 
anticipated in this era of typically intrastate conflicts and the accompanying hostilities towards 
civilians. The general consensus on some key issues from the ICISS proposals at the 2005 
summit was a significant milestone towards the development of R2P as a legal norm. As per 
Jutta and Stephen, though textual representation cannot be taken as reflective of a social norm, 
they can be helpful in the process.
226
 Thus the conclusions at the 2005 summit based on a 
compromise, the ensuing debates, deliberations and the recognition of a commitment to R2P in 
the UNGA have all served as an important platform for further development of the norm. The 
adoption and recognition by a majority of states at the 2009 UNGA debate of the R2P provisions 
in the 2005 World Summit outcome document could be a further attestation to the growing 
understanding and gradual recognition of the R2P norm.
227
 Equally significant is the UNSC‟s 
unanimous reaffirmation of the provisions in Articles 38 and 39 of the Summit document in its 
2006 Resolution No. 1674.
228
 
R2P has been associated with existing principles and practices of international law. First, the 
crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity etc, based on whose commission the principle is to 
be operational, are already crimes under international criminal law.
229
 Though hesitantly, the 
R2P doctrine has also been associated with the HI regime. Its supporters would not want to 
associate the new doctrine with the old regime of HI due to the intricacies attached to the latter; 
but, one cannot deny the proximity between the two concepts. As such one would not be wrong 
to opine that R2P has gained significant practice in international law under its predecessor 
doctrine, however inconsistent.   
Also, as an independent legal regime, and though not fully promulgated into law, R2P is making 
significant strides towards international legal recognition. As well as R2P meets some of the 
above mentioned criteria for legality, it has equally acquired some of the elements of the formal 
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requirements of international law according to Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute. An opinio juris 
seems to be gaining ground and if it is accompanied by consistent state practice, this would 
constitute customary law under Article 38 (1) of the ICJ Statute. Such required state practice 
could be said to be establishing itself even though it is still in its early stages. The articulation of 
R2P in recent conflict situations in Darfur 2003, and in Kenya after the post election violence in 
2008
230
, though not culminating to the application of forceful measures, signifies some degree of 
acknowledgement and acceptance of the norm. Moreover, the UNSC in its Resolution 1973 on 
Libya, for the first time authorized an intervention for the sole objective of protecting 
civilians.
231
 The above examples are such that could constitute significant evidence of practice 
accepted as law, and thus a source of international law as per Article 38(1) (b). Moreover, the 
proliferation of writings by highly skilled international jurists could be classified as teachings of 
qualified publicists as per Article 38(1) (d) and thus constitute a subsidiary source of 
international law.  
5.4 Conclusion 
R2P, as many commentators agree, has not yet fully acquired the status of an international legal 
norm. This is partly because of its lack of some important qualifiers for legality such as clarity 
and the absence of legislation.
232
 However, R2P certifies other important requirements for 
legality, and above all has made significant strides in the domain of international law making. 
Equally, one should not undermine the importance of R2P as a soft law instrument in the process 
of international law making. Referring to Thurlway on the importance of soft law, the less 
compelling nature of the R2P concept could considerably influence state practice that generates 
customary law. This is seen in the ability of states to gradually take measures that conform to 
international standards, even when they are unwilling to accept binding regulations on the same 
subject.  All in all R2P is a rapidly emerging legal norm which so far is still regarded as a 
political commitment to act on shared moral beliefs, much of which is embedded in already 
existing international law‟. 
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CHAPTER VI: R2P IN ACTION: THE LIBYAN INTERVENTION 
6.1 The Decision to Intervene 
The UNSC decision to intervene in Libya is said to be the first time that the international 
community is setting in motion the new R2P concept for forceful intervention in another state.
233
 
When taking the decision to intervene in Libya using its Chapter VII powers, the UNSC equally 
found in accordance with the R2P principle, namely that the Libyan government had failed to 
protect its citizens by itself committing gross violations of their rights.
234
 This phrasing and the 
actual move towards adopting a new approach to intervention for humanitarian reasons has led to 
the argument that the action in Libya was based on R2P. Thus, as espoused in this study, the 
extension of the UNSC powers under Article 39 to cover situations of purely humanitarian crisis 
where there is no actual threat to international peace and security could be one of the possible 
ways of practicing R2P. Based on this assumption, I will proceed to bring out the R2P elements 
in the Libyan action while still taking into consideration the lex lata. Though, this does not make 
R2P the current lex lata. 
6.1.1 The Humanitarian Crisis 
The crisis began on 15 February 2011 with anti government protests asking for an end to Colonel 
Gaddafi‟s 41 years in power.
235
 The early days in the Libyan uprising saw the government‟s 
resolve to brutally crack down on the protesters by dispatching the national army. Colonel 
Gaddafi in a speech on 22 February, called upon his supporters to attack the protesters and 
„cleanse Libya house by house‟.
236
 The bloody confrontations that ensued saw the anti-
government protesters seize the important opposition stronghold of Benghazi in the east 
including other strategic towns such as Misrata, Ras Lanuf, Tobruk Zawlya, Bin Jawad, Brega 
and Ajdabiya on their way westwards.
237
 This progress by the protesters was brutally countered 
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by government forces bent on quelling the uprising. This crackdown saw the death of hundreds 
of civilians. And according to early reports of the UNHCR a mass refugee crisis was underway 
on the borders with Tunisia and Egypt. In their update no. 1 on the humanitarian situation in 
Libya on 2
 
March 2011, the UNHCR reported a huge humanitarian crisis and that thousands of 
people were stranded in the borders between Libya and Tunisia and Egypt.
238
  
The situation in Libya had already deteriorated into a humanitarian crisis when the UNSC in 
condemning the actions of the Libyan government against civilians and imposing sanctions on 
the regime in UNSC resolution 1970, also found that the Libyan government was committing 
gross and systemic violation of human rights.
239
 The turning point of the crisis came when the 
government succeeded in taking over some rebel captured cities and vowed to launch a more 
virulent crack down on the opposition protesters in the densely populated city of Benghazi. 
Several media outlets and sources from Libya reported of violent fighting in the eastern towns 
along the road to Benghazi. Government forces were reported to be pounding the city of 
Ajdabiya with tanks, artillery, and war planes, and according to Libyan state TV, the government 
was cleansing the city of armed gangs.
240
 This was the point in the crisis that saw the UNSC 
yielding to calls from the Libyan people, the Arab League, and a cross section of the 
international community to vote for Resolution 1973. Non-forceful measures yielded to measures 
involving the use of force. 
6.1.2 International Condemnation 
The international community was shocked by the development of events in Libya, and the 
unrepentant nature of Colonel Gaddafi and the Libyan government bent on using sophisticated 
military hardware to maintain power. The international condemnation of Gaddafi has been 
overwhelming. The UNSG, the US President, the UK prime minister, the French President, the 
EU, the Arab League, the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), the African Union, the 
UNSC and a host of other governments and personalities termed the use of force by a 
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government against the anti-government protesters as outrageous and urged the government of 
Libya to meet with its responsibility to protect its people.  
UNSG Ban Ki Moon emphasized that the attack on civilians constituted a gross violation of 





February, in a press release on the situation in Libya, the UNSC called upon the Libyan 
government to meet its responsibility to protect its population.
242
 The African Union‟s Peace and 
Security Council in its 265
th
 meeting on 10 March 2011 decried the humanitarian situation and 
condemned the use of lethal weapons causing loss of civilian lifes.
243
 In a meeting held in Abu 
Dhabi on 7 March 2011, the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council demanded that the 
UNSC should take all necessary measures to protect civilians including the imposition of a no-
fly zone.
244
 The Arab League on its part strongly condemned forceful suppression of anti-
government protest by the Gaddafi regime and proceeded on 12 March to call on the Security 
Council to impose a no-fly zone.
245
 It is this international condemnation of the crisis in Libya by 
statesmen, leaders of international governmental and non-governmental organizations, regional 
organizations and the UN, coupled with the enormous threat it posed to the civilian population, 
that led to the UNSC‟s decision to take additional measures against the Gaddafi regime. 
At the peak of the fighting in Libya, the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) declared 
that tens of thousands of people were made to flee their homes and were stranded at the Libya-
Tunisia boarder. This caused a serious and large scale humanitarian crisis, as most of these 
people were waiting for several days to cross the border in search for safe havens and had to go 
without food, water and shelter. 
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6.1.3 Non-military measures 
The international condemnation of the Libyan government for its atrocious activities led to 
certain early and non military measures being taken to deter the government from continuing to 
brutally suppress the movement for democratic change. First, the UN Human Rights Council 
suspended Libya from the Council and urged the international community to step in and stop the 
brutal crackdown on anti government protesters.
246
 
The UNSC on 26 February 2011, by a unanimous vote, passed Resolution 1970 adopting certain 
non-forceful measures, while emphasizing the government‟s responsibility to protect its 
people.
247
 The resolution also referred the Libyan crisis to the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
for investigation into reports of crimes against humanity.
248
 The resolution equally imposed 
travel bans on 16 key figures in Libya and froze the assets of Colonel Gaddafi and his family 
members.
249
 Resolution 1970 moreover imposed an arms embargo on Libya and included a 
provision facilitating humanitarian assistance.
250
 In response to this UN Resolution, NATO 
decided to put in place measures to monitor the arms embargo. Other countries such as the US 
and UK have put in place unilateral measures including sanctions targeting key Libyan 
government officials, freezing their assets and severing of diplomatic relations with the Gaddafi 
government. Several former diplomats, government officials and top military officers defected 
from the Gaddafi administration to join the pro-democracy movement.  
6.1.4 Resolution 1973 
The UNSC on 17 March 2011, acting under the Chapter VII of the Charter, passed Resolution 
1973. Ten of the fifteen UNSC permanent members voted in the affirmative, none voted against, 
and five abstentions from India, Germany, Brazil and more importantly China and Russia which 
hold veto power but nevertheless abstained to use it.
251
 The resolution not only reinforced the 
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provisional measures adopted under Resolution 1970, but also established more coercive 
measures involving the use of armed force.
252
 In paragraph one of the resolution, the council 
demands a ceasefire and an end to all violence and attacks against civilians.
253
 More importantly, 
the resolution imposes a no-fly zone over the airspace of Libya in order to help protect civilians 
from attacks.
254
 Even more crucial is paragraph four titled „protection of civilians‟ which 
authorizes concerned member states and regional groupings to take all necessary measures to 
ensure the protection of civilians and civilian populated areas including Benghazi.
255
 However, 
the resolution prohibits any foreign occupation force of any form on any part of the Libyan 
territory.
256
 The resolution reinforces and strengthens the arms embargo passed in Resolution 
1970, and calls for its enforcement by member states through inspection of suspect vessels in 
their territorial waters and on the high sea of any vessels and aircrafts bound for Libya.
257
 It 
equally reinforces the assets freeze on top Libyan officials close to and cooperating with the 
Gaddafi regime in committing violence against civilians.
258
 
6.2 Evaluation  
The intervention in Libya is said to be a milestone in the development of the R2P regime of 
interventionism. Although the R2P concept has been invoked in different conflict situations in 
the past decade, for example in the Darfur conflict and in Kenya during the 2008 post electoral 
violence, it is the first time the UNSC has applied the R2P concept for intervention in a state for 
the protection of civilians using Article 41 (peaceful measures), and Article 42 (use of force) of 
the Charter. This argument linking the Libyan intervention with the practice of R2P by extension 
of the UNSC powers under Chapter VII to cover same is presumably based on the recent 
developments around the R2P such as its wide recognition at the 2009 UNGA debates and its 
progressive normative development. Despite the prevailing disagreements over the R2P 
principle, as the first test, the Libyan case could serve as an assessment of the R2P regime in 
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general, whether it satisfactorily reflects certain requirements of legality and legitimacy, and 
whether there has been congruency of actions with established law/rules and shared norms. This 
could be important in determining the progress of the R2P principle as an international legal 
norm. A success in the enforcement of the intervention mandate in Resolution 1973 in 
accordance with R2P standards would limit criticism that could contradict its acceptance as 
relevant practice in the development as customary international law. 
The civilian protection agenda of R2P was very prominent in the UNSC Resolution 1973 on the 
use of force in Libya. This is despite the use of the traditional Chapter VII grounds for the use of 
force as entry point and legal basis. Once again, there was an even more significant absence of 
any threat to international peace and security in the literary sense of the term. Although the 
resolution in its preamble stated that there was such a threat presumably based on the refugee 
crisis and the fragile situation at that time in the neighboring Egypt and Tunisia. Yet the 
existence and scale of such cross-border dimension is highly disputable. Whereas, the resolution 
reiterated the R2P principle, stating that the primary responsibility to protect the Libyan people 
was on the government and its failure to do so establishes international responsibility.
259
 The 
condemnation of the violence against pro-democracy protesters by many states, NGOs, IGOs, 
and ROs, all reiterating the need to protect civilians in Libya, was testimony of the growing 
shared social and normative understanding of R2P. The initiation and success of this vote could 
symbolize a gradual acceptance and development of R2P as a legal norm based on practice that 
could constitute customary international law.  
The decision to intervene in Libya was legal under international law and justified under the R2P 
preconditions for intervention and the jus ad bellum principles of JWT. It could be said that the 
just cause threshold of actual or imminent occurrence of irreparable harm to humans such as 
large scale loss of life, genocide or ethnic cleansing or other serious violations of international 
humanitarian law was met. Colonel Gaddafi‟s forces were brutally crushing the protesters using 
heavy artillery and were heading for a bloodier campaign in the densely populated city of 
Benghazi; there was thus a likelihood of an imminent occurrence of irreparable harm.  Many 
scholars and statesmen argued that inaction at this point could have led to a disaster that would 
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once again leave a stain on the conscience of the international community like that of Rwanda‟s 
1994 genocide.  
The UNSC accorded the necessary prior authorization for any military intervention to go ahead 
using its authority under Article 39 of the Charter. Despite the contradictory use of this 
provision, this authorization did not only conform to the JWT requirement for right authority, but 
did also conform to the cosmopolitan ideal of „one world, one government‟ with a right and just 
authority to approve any use of force in another state. The Council‟s vote was once more a 
testimony of the recognition of its continued role under the current lex lata and the move towards 
expanding same to situations where there is no actual threat to international peace and security 
but a threat to the lives of foreign citizens. Even the critics of the Council‟s decision seldom 
suggest its replacement, rather its possible reformation. 
Equally, the decision to intervene forcefully in Libya came only after other peaceful measures 
did not stop the killing of civilians. Even after the heavy sanctions against key figures in the 
Gaddafi regime, the arms embargoes and other unilateral measures by states, the Gaddafi regime 
still attacked and threatened to clamp-down on protesters in the densely populated cities of its 
eastern region. One could argue at this point that the last resort requirement of both JWT and 
R2P was fulfilled though some critics question whether all other peaceful measures were 
exhausted.
260
 However, the potential damaging effect of any delays to act requires that any 
peaceful measures be quick and effective and that there is an immediate shift to forceful 
measures immediately peaceful measures fail. This last resort argument is likened to the 
provision for non-forceful measures according to Article 41 of the UN Charter. 
Furthermore, the motives at the outset of the intervention were given, namely to protect civilians. 
This was in accordance with the R2P requirement for guarantees to support „right motive‟ based 
on multilateral rather than on a single country basis of intervention, regional support and the 
support of the people concerned. All these conditions were satisfied prior to the decision to 
intervene in Libya. However, there have been worries about the manifestation of mixed motives 
of the intervening state. This was the case for example according to the declarations of China and 
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The decision to intervene in Libya received widespread support from the international 
community at its inception, but did not go without criticism regarding its implementation. At the 
time of writing, there are already questions about the lack of proportionality, mixed motives, and 
the double standards involved in the action.
262
 There have been rising concerns over civilian 
casualties resulting from airstrikes from coalition forces; there have equally been records of 
heavy bombardments of both military and non-military infrastructure, an act openly admitted by 
NATO.
263
 This act of NATO has even been condemned by some NATO members like Italy who 
called for a halt to the bombing raid, equally, the Arab League which initially called for the 
action expressed it reservations on the intensity of the bombing campaign.
264
 Moreover, the 
decision by France to supply the Libyan rebels with arms has raised a lot of controversy. This 
has raised questions over the ulterior motives of some NATO members and the apparent 
violation of resolution 1973 and the arms embargo in resolution 1970.
265
 This has led to worries 
about how proportionate the action to protect civilians really was. A potential disproportionate 
action risk tainting the continuing legitimacy of the action carried out to protect civilians. And 
this also risks tainting the entire credibility of the emerging R2P doctrine. The inability of the 
UNSC to take any steps to protect the civilians in Syria corroborates the latter assertion. 
However, the question of overall proportionality when it comes to HI often requires balancing 
the overall good/evil the use of force will bring, and the evil of not resorting to force.
266
 There 
have often been divergent views when it comes to assessing the overall good and evil of an 
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 Like in the case of Libya, it is often difficult to get a true picture of the events on 
the ground in an ongoing operation in other to measure the overall good and evil. This coupled 
with the fact that the cause for intervention or the evil to be avoided is not necessarily based on 
calculation but sometimes on speculation, makes the issue of proportionality more complex. 
Nevertheless, the destructive capacity of armed force and the possibility of harm inflicted upon 
civilians seemingly call for more caution and a stricter application of the rule of proportionality. 
There have also been controversies over the mixed messages sent by some members of the 
coalition forces about the need for Colonel Gaddafi to leave office, and other allegations of self 
interest motives of the individual powers involved in the enforcement of resolution 1973. This is 
contrary to the R2P principle against self interest motives and the overthrow of regimes. The 
decision to intervene in Libya and not in Syria, Yemen and Bahrain which saw similar gross 
violations, abuses and threats to civilians, has raised serious questions about double standards 
and how it could affect future decision making. These worries have been expressed by some veto 
powers of the UNSC like China and other major states and ROs.
268
 And has even culminated to 




At the UNSC meeting on 10
 
May 2011 to discuss the protection of civilians in armed conflicts, 
the members of the Council, several other representatives of UN member states, and 
representatives of international governmental institutions expressed their concerns over the plight 
of civilians in armed conflicts.
270
 While commending the UNSC for taking action in time to stop 
the massacre of civilians, most participants at the meeting lamented the continuous killing of 
civilians and cautioned against lack of proportionality, mixed motives or hidden agenda which 
compromise the noble civilian protection objectives, the double standards, the need for a 
consistent and comprehensive approach to civilian protection and above all, the respect for 
fundamental principles of international law. The UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian 
Affairs Ms Amos specifically cautioned against the potential undermining of the civilian 
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protection agenda in Libya, and reiterated the important role of the action in providing a 




From the above, one can conclude that the Libyan action is a major case were R2P has been put 
to test. It serves as a further platform for states to test the practice and boundaries of the R2P 
doctrine. The condemnation of the Libyan government for failing to protect its people by many 
states and some ROs, and the eventual implementation of non-forceful and forceful measures, 
proved once again the degree of international recognition of the principle. However, the R2P 
principle did not serve as a legal basis for intervention; rather, the UNSC preferred once again 
the more established and legally binding proviso of threat to international peace and security 
despite the apparent lack of any such threats. This is an apparent move to extend the threshold 
under Article 39 of the Charter to cover not only situations where there is breach of international 
peace and security but equally where there are gross violations of rights of foreign citizens. 
Nevertheless, this action proved the ability of soft law to influence states action that conform to 
international standards and one that could lead to customary law.  
One can equally draw from the above that some of the major obstacles to the noble principle of 
the protection of civilians include the failure to match action with established laws and shared 
norms, and the violation or misuse of an intervention mandate which might affect future decision 
making. As observed above, the ICISS report holds that finding a consensus on the intervention 
regime would require more than determining who authorizes an intervention and when. That 
enforcement action must equally be based on clear and strict rules that are objective and 
proportionate. Equally it is important for the purpose of legitimacy and continuity, that each 
mandate for intervention is based on clear and specific terms which are respected. According to 
Jutta and Stephen, a mere UNSC vote will not be enough, and the R2P will not emerge as a 
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global legal norm unless there emerges a consistent practice that adheres to requirements of 
legality and upholds shared norms.
272
  
The failure to act in Syria is perhaps the best example of the effects of such failure to match 
action with established norms, and the abuse or violation of intervention mandates. The crisis in 
Syria which is still ongoing at the time of writing had resulted in the killing of more than a 
thousand people and other gross human right violations.
273
 Yet the UNSC has been reluctant to 
react to the situation. It took a long struggle and hesitation for the UNSC to issue a mere 
statement condemning the massive killing of civilians and other acts of violations of human 
rights. And yet hundreds of civilian lives continue to be in danger every day as the protesters 
remain defiant and the government is bent on brutally cracking down on the protests. This delay 
to take action in Syria to protect civilians may be attributed partly to the reluctance of some 
members of the UNSC to give their accord to another military mandate that might end up being 
misinterpreted and overstretched according to the priorities of the intervening powers. This is 
evidenced by the vetoes of Russia and China of any serious UNSC resolutions on Syria, arguing 
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CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
7.1 Summary 
I have been arguing for the need of a new legal regime for intervention for humanitarian 
purposes. In doing this, I have attempted to respond to two overarching questions namely; 
whether the current legal construction of HI is still tenable, and if not whether a new legal 
structure under R2P is the way ahead. From the above questions emerged other sub-questions 
which are: (1) Is HI in conformity with international law as traditionally understood? (2) Does 
the R2P provide sufficient doctrinal remedies for the controversies surrounding HI? (3) What is 
the normative status of the R2P principle? (4) Has there emerged an effective practice of R2P? 
My working hypothesis has been that the current regime humanitarian forceful intervention has 
failed to provide sufficient answers to the question of intervention in another state to prevent 
humanitarian tragedies and protect civilians. And that a new regime is necessary that would meet 
the changing understandings of international relations, international human rights and 
international law.                  
7.2 Findings 
In approaching the first main question as to whether the current construction of HI is still 
tenable, I posed a further sub-question to wit: Is HI in conformity with international law as 
traditionally understood? In other words, does it conform to the requirements of treaty law or has 
it emerged from an effective practice that could qualify as customary international law? The 
response to these questions raised first, the dilemma of sovereignty and non-intervention 
(peremptory norms of international law) vis a vis the need to intervene for humanitarian reasons.  
I found that the traditional sovereignty and non intervention principles have been a strong force 
guiding the relations between states. However, this controversial section of international law has 
witnessed a growing compromise between the respect for sovereignty and non-intervention with 
the need to intervene in exceptional circumstances. This could be a result of the consequences of 
a strict adherence to the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. Another worrying issue 
remained the fact that HI is not explicitly provided for as one of the exceptions from UN Charter 
Article 2(4). This has been one of the main problems with the need to intervene for humanitarian 
purposes and has been the cause of most controversies surrounding the principle of HI. However, 
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the growing importance of human rights, especially the need to protect people from gross 
violations of their rights, have however seen the UN through the UNSC in some rare cases 
invoke its powers under Chapter VII of the Charter to intervene for humanitarian purposes. Other 
states and ROs have equally invoked the doctrine to intervene in some places where the UN was 
delaying to act or failed to act at all. These actions have been seen as not in conformity with the 
UN Charter and have been subject to a lot of criticisms. And the principle of HI itself has hardly 
gained universal acceptance or recognition. It is on this basis - the lack of HI in the Charter, the 
inconsistencies in the UN actions, and the lack of sufficient opinio juris and state practice - that 
there has failed to emerge a consistent and customary practice of HI. Thus, the doctrine of HI has 
not lived up to expectations, hence the move to reconceptualize and adopt a new approach under 
the R2P principle. 
In responding to the second overarching question, namely whether the R2P principle is the 
panacea, other sub-questions (two to four above) arose namely, whether the R2P concept 
provides sufficient doctrinal remedies for the controversies surrounding HI, what the normative 
status of the R2P principle is and finally whether an effective practice of R2P has emerged. I 
answered the second overarching question by finding that, R2P is the way forward for 
intervention for humanitarian purposes despite its current legal status and the challenges to its 
application. This conclusion follows from the findings namely that, R2P is rooted in ideal moral 
and ethical principles of JWT and cosmopolitanism. R2P has been widely accepted as a shared 
social norm and is fast emerging as an international legal norm, though for the moment still 
remains non-binding. However, that despite the widespread recognition of the principle, there 
has not emerged an effective and consistent practice. Even the recent practice of R2P in Libya 
has raised serious worries regarding its credibility and its ability to set precedence for customary 
international law. There has already been some implications on subsequent policy and practice 
on intervention. The Syrian case and the inaction of the UNSC in the face of gross violations 
against civilians is evidence of this gap. The reluctance of the UNSC members to act and 
condemn the violence is seemingly linked with the apparent failure of the enforcing states in 
Libya to act fully in accordance with the mandate and shared normative standards (the 
congruency test).  
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Summing up, though the R2P doctrine has gained widespread support and is developing rapidly 
as a legal norm, like its predecessor regime of HI, it has yet to gain a universal acceptance and 
legal recognition. However, its current status as soft law and its ability to mobilize state practice 
and provide opinio juris could signal the direction of future legal development. There is no doubt 
that the foundations of the R2P principle are solid but it requires continuous dialogue to achieve 
the necessary compromises. Also, there is need for its precise normative character to be clearly 
defined and for the criteria for its legality to be met and applied to the letter. If the cosmopolitan 
ideals of universalism and egalitarianism leading to respect for human rights are held to be true, 
the need to prevent violation of rights anywhere would be a moral obligation. And when we 
decide to act forcefully based on the acknowledgement of our cosmopolitan nature, it would be 
based on a just cause and with restraint. Interestingly enough, the R2P project provides a bridge 
between the radical and ambitious just war and cosmopolitan ideals, and the realities of our 
current international community of sovereign states. This is as the R2P adopts position of 
contemporary just war scholars by for example developing new threshold for what constitutes 
just cause to fit the realities of contemporary conflicts. Also, the R2P acknowledges the 
possibility of a universal protection of human rights in the current system of community of 
sovereign states rather than the „one world one government‟ approach of some radical 
cosmopolitans. 
7.3 Recommendations   
Therefore, if R2P is the way forward for a new legal regime for humanitarian forceful 
intervention, it goes without saying that there is need for more to be done for it to become a 
legally binding norm of international law. Though the ICISS report and the 2004 High Level 
Panel Report provide guidelines on how a new R2P concept should be operationalised, there is 
still much to be done to clearly define what is and what is not part of R2P. Also, in the view of 
Brunee and Toope‟s interactional account of international law; on how international law is 
created and maintained through an interaction of three elements, namely our shared 
understanding of social norms, the specific criteria for legality and application,one can say that 





 Even its application in the Libyan conflict, which I consider the 
major first test of the principle, did not emerge a complete success due to the challenges with the 
implementation of the UNSC mandate on forceful intervention. Thus, the R2P concept has not 
acquired a well defined character, is still non-binding and without a consistent practice. This 
leaves open the debate for suggestions or recommendations.  
First, I believe that if R2P is well operationalized, this could significantly enhance its legal 
character. Operationalization here would mean making the concept clearer and distinguish what 
is and what is not a part of it. For example it is still unclear whether R2P should apply as a 
component of the UNSC mandate under Article 39 of the Charter, or if it should be considered as  
not being covered by the prohibition in Article 2 (4), or as a fourth exception to the latter article. 
However, the wide recognition of a UNSC role by many states and scholars with regards to 
authorizing humanitarian forceful interventions under R2P seems to suggest the relevance of the 
UNSC authorization in no matter what approach is adopted for R2P.  I will therefore advocate 
for continuous dialogue and debate e.g. in the UNGA in a bid to properly define and determine 
the precise character of R2P and encourage state practice that could test its boundaries. By so 
doing it is possible to go a long way to establishing the necessary opinio juris and state practice 
that constitutes customary international law. However, it is worth emphasizing that any such 
dialogue or debate on collective action under R2P should take into consideration the progressive 
development of relevant principles of international law. 
Also, to further enhance the legality of R2P besides the three elements of Brunee and Toope‟s 
interactional account of international law, there has been a widely held view that certain 
institutional reforms are necessary within the UNSC to further enhance predictability and wider 
representation in this body widely regarded as ideal to authorize humanitarian forceful 
intervention. Any such reforms should be geared towards increasing the credibility and 
effectiveness of the Council. One could also seek to motivate other institutions to work more 
effectively with the UNSC in assisting in this critical task of civilian protection, for example the 
collaboration with international human rights or humanitarian organizations to determine when 
such crimes have reached the bar that would warrant intervention under the R2P doctrine. Also, 
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other measures could be taken to ensure accountability of member states charged with 
implementing UNSC mandates for forceful humanitarian interventions. Such may include, 
implementing sanctions or actions against states for overstepping intervention mandates. 
Moreover, future UNSC mandates should have clearer terms and be as void as possible of 
ambiguities. However I will only consider the proposed UNSC reform in more detail below. 
The debate on the UN Charter and UNSC reform has been recurrent in recent times in 
international fora, especially at the UNGA. It is often considered that the present composition of 
the UNSC is anachronistic. It is considered unrepresentative of the growing membership and 
changing dynamics in world politics,
276
 and its functioning has been flawed by the veto politics. 
This has partly been the reason behind the inconsistencies of the UNSC in the face of massive 
human rights violations and crimes against humanity. There has been a persistent outcry from 
other major powers and developing countries for the need for more representation on the 
Council. This is seen as a reasonable request that could enhance the functioning and legitimacy 
of the UNSC and could be decisive for the new R2P doctrine. To this end, there are plausible 
suggestions tabled by the high-level panel report which are worth considering by the UNGA in 
other to fill this gap and meet with the expectations and the changing global dynamics. The first 
suggestion proposes six new permanent seats with no veto, and three new two-year non-
permanent seats, divided amongst the major regional areas as stated in the report. The second 
proposal provides for no new permanent seats but creates a new category of eight four-year 
renewable term seats and one new two-year non-permanent and non-renewable seat, divided 
amongst the major regional areas as stated in the report.
277
 Both proposals are crucial for meeting 
the growing need for a broader representation on the UNSC. However, I believe the second 
proposal may serve more in terms of continuity and review of effectiveness of the Council by 
avoiding the creation of more permanent members who might at a given time be found unsuited 
for the role. It can possibly also avoid the trouble of constantly reviewing permanent 
membership according to the changing demands of the respective regional areas or new demands 
from other states. Equally important is that both proposals seem to answer the question of 
expansion of the veto with a categorical no. 
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However, the question still remains as to what proper criteria should be followed for the 
selection of the new permanent or more non-permanent representatives. The panel of experts‟ 
report mentions in paragraph 249 four items to be taking into consideration: a more 
representative and broader membership including especially developing countries, new members 
should not impair the effectiveness of the Council, the new set-up should increase the democratic 
and accountable nature of the Council, and above all the requirement in line with Article 23 of 
the Charter, to involve in decision making those states who contribute most to the UN, militarily, 
financially and diplomatically.
278
 The above requirements seem reasonable to me and it is 
important that the overall purpose of broader representation and increased effectiveness be 
ultimately prioritized. This process of reform may seem farfetched or unrealistic, but, it is 
important to have in mind that these are very important decisions hinging on the very important 
foundational roles of the UN, the infrastructure of world peace and security, so it would require 
caution and due diligence.  
Also, the issue of veto remains complicated. The veto wielding UNSC permanent members have 
in the past used or threatened to use their veto powers to either delay or bar actions irrespective 
of the human cost and international condemnation. Amongst the scenarios often cited are the 
violent and largely failed attempts to stem armed conflicts in Iraq and Kosovo, and the less 
robust action or inaction in stopping genocide and crimes against humanity in Rwanda and 
Sudan. It is worrying that this anachronistic and undemocratic embodiment of the UNSC could 
be a major obstacle for the new commitment to avoid the repetition of scenarios such as that of 
Rwanda in 1994. However, with the practical difficulties involved such as the powers of the veto 
powers under Articles 108 and 109 (2), it could be very difficult to change this status quo. Thus, 
avoiding a further expansion of the veto powers as suggested by the panel of experts will be the 
right thing to do.  However, there is another plausible way out of the veto problem or any UNSC 
failure to act in the event of genocide or other crimes against humanity, not involving any 
unilateral or bilateral forceful interventions of states. This could be as proposed by the panel of 
experts, to recourse to the entire community of states through the UNGA for a vote in the form 
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of the 1950 „Uniting for Peace Resolution‟.
279
 This is an approach that could fit well in the 
category of a possible fourth exception to the prohibition on use of force. That is where the 
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